What it should do next ?

The Indian army has played a pivotal role in Jammu and Kashmir. This role started  in 1947  after Maharaja Hari Singh acceded the state to India, and requested for the Indian army to push back Pakistani troops, camouflaged as tribesmen, who had invaded the Himalayan territory and captured large chunks of it. Ever since it is an integral part of Jammu and Kashmir’s security  as the adversary on the other side of the ceasefire line ( now Line of Control or LOC) did not relent in its machinations to bleed and grab Kashmir.

There are two critical phases that define its role after 1947-48, 1965 and 1971 war. These spotlight on the past 35 years, which has been a critically crucial geopolitical period for the state, and now as the Union Territory. The soldiers have made supreme sacrifices  to secure Kashmir against the external and internal threats. One was to fight the militancy on the borders-the infiltration part of it, and second  it had to deal with the internal dimensions in which the anti-India elements saw supply of arms and ammunition and trained militants as a big boost to their military activities as also a critical help to expand the psyche of anti-India politics , which was sanctified as a religious obligation. In fact, that was  an attempt to revive the two-nation theory that Kashmir’s leadership in 1940s had rejected in favour of a secular India.

Kashmir is embedded in Sufi cult which transcends all religious barriers. This has its own inspiration for the world as  this land of Nund Rishi and Lal Ded nurtured a cultural ethos of harmony. This withstood many onslaughts over the centuries. This remains its strength today even despite suffering many wounds that continue to fester.

In 1990s, the Indian army was assigned the task almost similar to what it had performed in 1947-48 but with a difference. But the challenges were of much higher grade than 1947. In 1990s it had to  re-establish the writ of the state within J&K. The battle  was on physical and psychological planes.

The challenges were so huge and dynamic in its nature that army had to strategise and re-strategise  almost all the time. It was a very complex situation  which  continues to be a big challenge for the analysts to put in a proper perspective. The army which had been dealing with the adversaries on the borders was placed in an unenviable situation. On borders, it knew the enemy and where to target them, but in the hinterland, the option to open fire was there but not without risking pitfalls. The enemy was operating behind  a number of shields – human, crowded markets, and next door boys in the neighbhourhood. The propaganda from across  had  swayed minds to the extent  that militants were deemed as “our boys” , and the perception about the men who would chase them or neutralise  is not something which is unimaginable. Still the army had to save these shields of “our boys” as it had to honour its discipline and protocol.

In 1990s, there were two kinds of militants. One, who would appear with their guns and grenades, open fire  in public places,  and  melt with crowds running after these attacks. Second, were those who planned the attacks and strategised narratives to undermine the idea of India. Their purpose was to show India in poor light. The thesis was that India was in Kashmir only because of the ever-rising number of its soldiers.

Without reflecting on the situation that preceded the calendar year of 1990 and thereafter, it is very difficult to assess the role of the army in Kashmir. The writ of the Indian state had started crumbling  in late 1980s as the people had nothing to hope from Government of India. Their democratic rights were trampled upon. This anger was brewing  over the repeated cheating of their votes, 1987 happened to be a flashpoint. Perhaps it was that for the first time a Muslim nited force under the religio-political platform Muslim United Front, better known as MUF, was in fight against  National Conference, the original party of the Valley. National Conference  too had its religious and political orientation, the only difference was that it was a convert from Muslim Conference to its current name, while the MUF proclaimed itself to be the champion of  the “Islamic rule”.

And when the militancy erupted in its full form, it took everyone by surprise. The government of India of the day, clueless as it was about Kashmir situation preferred to brush aside all the emerging signs of the brewing storm; it put the army on frontline to tackle terror-violence, without attempting to resolve the underlying causes. That made army to go by its own protocol with no political and social support from any quarter. The political class of all hues was resistant to the idea of helping the  state to rebuild its system  as they were too scared of challenging the writ of militants. Their fear kept them away from aligning with the army, which had  become all powerful that time. By default  BJP that was part of the coalition government headed  by V P Singh, did cry foul. But it was more interested in exploiting the migration of Kashmiri  Pandits. That continues to be an issue with the party till date without any firm plan to get them back to their homeland. That promise is yet to be delivered. The promises without a deadline often end up in  illusions.

The reliance on the army in Kashmir is expanding. The governments and the  political system in the country have not been able to think of Kashmir without the presence of troops.

There are possibly  two reasons: one, Pakistan is continuing with its proxy war. It is also changing its strategies to hurt India  via Kashmir. It has shown its inclination in experimenting  with the low intensity  conflict to full-fledged war-Kargil ,war in the summer of 1999. It is now engaged in different kind of terrorism – it is extensively using cyber world to incite new brand of insurgency-cum terrorism which has less to do with the guns and bombs  and more with stoking the mindset of conflict, challenging the Indian system of governance in Jammu and Kashmir.

Second, the trust deficit vis-à-vis Kashmir’s internal situation has not diluted. Thirty-five years have gone down in the history but the gap on this front is what it was when the militancy began. Physical distances might have been covered, but the psyche has remained unchanged. That leads us to the conclusion that the current arrangement of army as the sole guarantee of peace or perception of it will continue in future. But this has other side  too. The army should mull over it in the national interest.