The Weaponisation of Water

“Control the source, control the future.” — Ancient Chinese Strategic Principle

 Bottom Line Up Front: China’s approval of the world’s largest hydropower dam at the Yarlung Tsangpo’s Great Bend represents a paradigm shift in geopolitical competition, transforming water infrastructure from economic development tool to strategic weapon. This $137 billion project fundamentally alters the balance of power in South Asia, forcing India into reactive dam-building while creating unprecedented risks for 42 million people downstream.

The Strategic Masterstroke

On December 25, 2024—a date chosen with unmistakable symbolism—China officially approved construction of the Medog Hydropower Station at the Great Bend of the Yarlung Tsangpo River in Tibet. This $137 billion mega-project, generating 300 billion kilowatt-hours annually, dwarfs the Three Gorges Dam by a factor of three and represents more than just an engineering marvel. It is, in the words of geostrategist Brahma Chellaney, potentially “a ticking water bomb” for downstream communities and a calculated geopolitical manoeuvre disguised as climate action.

The timing is hardly coincidental. As noted by Neely Haby in her Australian Strategic Policy Institute analysis, this announcement came during a period of tentative China-India border rapprochement, yet the project’s location—mere kilometres from the disputed Line of Actual Control—suggests Beijing’s true intentions extend far beyond clean energy generation.

The Hydro-Hegemony Playbook

China’s Yarlung Tsangpo project follows a well-established pattern of what experts term “hydro-hegemony”—the use of water infrastructure to gain leverage over downstream nations. As documented in multiple sources, China has already deployed this strategy along the Mekong River, where 11 giant dams have created what researchers describe as a “fait accompli” approach: construct in secrecy, reveal only when satellite imagery makes concealment impossible, then present the project as irreversible.

The pattern is chillingly consistent. Fan Xiao, the renowned Chinese geologist whose analysis has been translated by Probe International, reveals that the Great Bend Dam isn’t even needed for Tibet’s energy requirements. Sichuan and Yunnan provinces already release excess hydropower due to oversupply. The real driver, as Fan notes, appears to be “the allure of increased GDP, investment, and tax revenue”—and, though unstated, strategic leverage.

Four Pillars of Coercive Potential

Drawing from Haby’s comprehensive analysis, the Great Bend Dam creates four distinct vectors of strategic coercion:

Political Control Through Infrastructure: As demonstrated by China’s construction of 100-home civilian villages in disputed territories, major infrastructure projects serve to consolidate Beijing’s claims. The Great Bend Dam extends this salami-slicing strategy to a new scale, creating irreversible facts on the ground just before water enters Indian territory.

Strategic Flooding as Warfare: The Kakhovka Dam’s destruction in Ukraine demonstrated water infrastructure’s potential as a weapon of war. China’s capacity to release massive water volumes during monsoon seasons—or withhold them during droughts—gives Beijing the ability to cause humanitarian disasters downstream. As documented, China has already weaponized this capability, suspending data-sharing during the 2017 and 2020 border crises.

Population Manipulation Through Scarcity: The Mekong experience provides a blueprint. Chinese upstream damming permanently altered agricultural viability and forced population migration from traditional farming lands to urban areas. With 42 million Indians residing in the Brahmaputra basin, similar demographic manipulation could destabilise India’s politically sensitive northeastern states.

Bargaining Leverage: Perhaps most insidiously, China’s pattern of selective cooperation—offering water data to Bangladesh while withholding it from India, or funding tributary restoration in one nation while building mega-dams affecting another—demonstrates how water becomes diplomatic currency. As multiple sources note, “conversation is currency when it comes to the Chinese Government.”

India’s Reactive Dilemma

India’s response reflects the strategic bind created by China’s upstream advantage. The proposed Siang Upper Multipurpose Project (SUMP)—an 11,000 MW dam in Arunachal Pradesh costing $13.2 billion—represents New Delhi’s attempt to create defensive capacity against Chinese water manipulation. Deputy Chief Minister Chowna Mein’s stark assessment that “the Siang dam will be our counter to the Chinese mega-dam. This is a matter of national security” captures the zero-sum nature of this competition.

Yet India’s reactive positioning creates multiple vulnerabilities. Local opposition to SUMP from indigenous Adi communities—who consider the Siang sacred—highlights the political costs of defensive dam-building. As protesters demand “No dam over Ane Siang [Mother Siang],” the Indian government finds itself caught between geopolitical necessity and domestic resistance.

Moreover, as environmental experts warn, India’s defensive dam could prove “potentially more dangerous” than China’s project, given the region’s seismic activity and engineering challenges. The December 2024 7.1-magnitude earthquake near Shigatse, causing structural deformations in nearby dams, underscores these risks.

The Broader Strategic Context

This water competition occurs within a larger framework of Sino-Indian rivalry that extends across domains from border disputes to technological competition. The Great Bend Dam’s proximity to Arunachal Pradesh—which China labels “South Tibet”—adds territorial dimensions to water conflicts. As recent analysis indicates, China’s dam-building effectively creates “chokehold leverage” over India’s economy if tensions escalate.

The environmental implications compound strategic concerns. Chinese ecologist Fan Xiao’s detailed analysis reveals the project threatens one of Asia’s most precious biodiversity hotspots, containing ancient forests and the world’s richest assemblage of large carnivores. The canyon’s role in triggering Asia’s annual monsoons means ecological disruption could have continent-wide climate consequences.

International Law and Accountability Gaps

The absence of robust international frameworks governing transboundary river development becomes starkly evident in this case. Neither India nor China has signed the UN’s international watercourses convention, while their 2002 water data-sharing agreement lacks legal binding power and has already proven fragile during crisis periods.

As Haby’s analysis suggests, this regulatory vacuum enables China’s unilateral approach. Beijing’s claims of having “indisputable sovereignty” over waters within its borders fundamentally challenges international water law principles requiring upstream nations to consider downstream impacts.

Strategic Recommendations: Beyond Reactive Responses

The gravity of this challenge demands responses that transcend traditional diplomatic protests. Three strategic imperatives emerge:

Technology-Enabled Transparency: Following the successful Mekong Dam Monitor model, establishing satellite-based monitoring systems for the Brahmaputra basin could replace bilateral cooperation with technological verification. Open-source data repositories would expose Chinese manipulation while providing early warning capabilities for downstream communities.

Legal-Diplomatic Coordination: International pressure based on customary law—particularly the 1968 Helsinki Rules and 1997 UN Convention principles requiring prior consultation and harm mitigation—could constrain Chinese unilateralism. However, this requires coordinated multilateral action extending beyond bilateral India-China frameworks.

Quad Framework Integration: Incorporating water security into the Quad’s humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) guidelines would create multilateral capacity for dam-related contingencies while sending political signals about international concern over China’s hydro-hegemony.

The Precedent’s Implications

The Great Bend Dam’s approval establishes dangerous precedents extending far beyond the Himalayan region. If successful, China’s model of unilateral mega-dam construction on transboundary rivers could be replicated across Asia’s major river systems. The project demonstrates how infrastructure development can be weaponized while maintaining plausible cover as climate action.

For India, this represents a fundamental test of strategic adaptability. Moving beyond reactive dam-building to proactive international coalition-building and technological solutions could transform a defensive position into leadership on transboundary water governance.

 Conclusion: Water as the New Battlefield

China’s Great Bend Dam project marks water’s emergence as a primary domain of strategic competition in the 21st century. As climate change intensifies resource scarcity and population pressures mount, control over transboundary water flows becomes increasingly valuable strategic currency.

The project’s $137 billion investment demonstrates Beijing’s commitment to hydro-hegemony as a tool of statecraft. India’s response—and the international community’s willingness to address this challenge—will determine whether water infrastructure becomes normalized as a coercive instrument or constrained through effective international governance.

The stakes extend far beyond bilateral China-India relations. The 1.35 billion people dependent on Tibetan Plateau water sources face an uncertain future where their water security depends not on climate patterns or economic development, but on the geopolitical calculations of upstream powers. In this new era of competition, water has become both the battlefield and the weapon—a reality that demands urgent international attention and coordinated response mechanisms before it’s too late.

(The author draws on recent analyses by Brahma Chellaney, Neely Haby (Australian Strategic Policy Institute), Fan Xiao (Chinese geologist), and Y. Nithiyanandam, alongside current reporting on China’s December 2024 project approval and India’s responsive measures.)