The Tragedy of Great Power Politics

John J. Mearsheimer’s The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001, 555 pp.) is a landmark work in international relations. In this book, Mearsheimer presents his theory of offensive realism, which explains why great powers constantly compete for dominance. The central idea is simple: in a world without a central authority to enforce rules, states must rely on themselves to survive. As Mearsheimer writes, “Great powers are always searching for opportunities to gain power over their rivals, because only the strongest states can ensure their survival.” This ongoing struggle for power is what he calls the “tragedy” of great power politics.

The book begins by setting out five key assumptions. First, the international system is anarchic—there is no global government to guarantee security. Second, all states possess military capabilities. Third, states can never be fully certain about the intentions of other states. Fourth, survival is the most fundamental goal of every state. Fifth, states are rational actors that make strategic decisions to maximize their security. From these assumptions, Mearsheimer builds his argument: “In an anarchic world, states cannot be certain that others will not try to dominate them; therefore, they must assume the worst and prepare for it.” This drives states to constantly seek more power, often aiming for regional dominance.

Mearsheimer’s offensive realism differs from defensive realism, which argues that states seek only enough power to protect themselves. According to him, states that stop seeking power risk being dominated by others. Historical examples support this theory. He shows how European powers repeatedly clashed from the Napoleonic Wars through the First and Second World Wars. He also examines the United States’ pursuit of regional dominance in the Western Hemisphere. As he notes, “Even when great powers appear to cooperate, they do so only temporarily and often out of fear or self-interest.”

The book also critiques liberal and idealist approaches. Mearsheimer argues that institutions like the United Nations, NATO, or the World Trade Organization cannot enforce peace independently. They operate only when strong states allow them to. He also challenges the idea that democracy, globalization, or trade can prevent conflict. “Peace is temporary, and rivalry is permanent,” he writes, emphasizing that great power competition is a constant in world politics.

One of the most important parts of the book is Mearsheimer’s prediction about China. Writing in 2001, he warned that a rising China would eventually challenge the United States for dominance in Asia. He stated, “No rising power can peacefully challenge a dominant power without provoking a response.” Today, tensions between Washington and Beijing over trade, technology, the South China Sea, and Taiwan show the accuracy of this prediction.

The strengths of the book lie in its clear reasoning, strong historical evidence, and predictive insight. It provides a framework to understand why international peace is fragile and why rivalry among great powers is recurrent. Critics, however, argue that Mearsheimer’s approach is too rigid. It leaves little room for diplomacy, domestic politics, or cultural factors, and may overstate the inevitability of conflict between major powers.

In conclusion, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics is essential read for anyone studying international relations. Its message is direct and relevant: “Power, fear, and survival drive state behavior, and conflict is often unavoidable.” Mearsheimer combines theory, history, and analysis to explain why great powers behave as they do. This book remains a critical resource for understanding the past, present, and future of global politics.

The author is a teacher and scholar, specialising in human rights, peace studies, and international relations.