South Asia's Shifting Landscape
In South Asia, alliances are shifting and undergoing transformations. New strategies and stratagems are evolving as old rivalries or opposing countries take on new dimensions, with new foes turning friends, proving that strange bedfellows are not ruled out in politics.
With the global and regional geopolitical fabric in flux, emerging partnerships between India and Afghanistan, as well as Pakistan and Bangladesh, are reshaping the power balance of South Asia.
These developments in SAARC, which continue to remain obsolete under the influence of the India-Pakistan rivalry, highlight the growing complexities as external powers like China, the United States and even countries within South Asia and West Asia are observing the shifting sand and changing political tectonic plates with much interest.
However, the big question remains whether these redefining and changing relationships among key South Asian countries will shape relationships with other global powers that matter.
One thing is clear: the changes are going to introduce fresh undercurrents and challenges into the region’s long-standing rivalries. They may bring some fresh blood to the functioning of the defunct SAARC. The ripple effects are likely to be felt well into 2025 and beyond.
India and Afghanistan - A Strategic Realignment
Since the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan in 2021, India has engaged with the regime in ways that would have seemed unlikely five years ago. India’s engagement with Afghanistan under the Taliban regime marks one of the most unexpected shifts in South Asia’s geopolitical narrative. Historically, the Taliban has been closely aligned with Pakistan, which supported its rise to power during Afghanistan’s turbulent past. However, the equation has altered significantly since the Taliban’s 2.0 return to power in 2021.
One cannot forget the way India was treated in Afghanistan when its passenger plane was hijacked in December 1999 and landed in Kandahar. During those years of conflict, the Taliban relied heavily on Pakistan for support, and their attacks on Indian positions and interests, such as the 2009 bombing of the Indian Embassy in Kabul, remain fresh in memory.
It was difficult for the Indians to travel to the country. However, the end of the U.S. war in Afghanistan has diminished Pakistan’s leverage over the Taliban. Tensions between Islamabad and Kabul over anti-Pakistan militants and cross-border clashes on the Durand Line have brought mistrust between Pakistan and Afghanistan leadership. The space available has opened the door for India to recalibrate its approach.
India has partially reopened its embassy in Kabul and initiated diplomatic engagements with Taliban leaders. High-level meetings, such as the January 8 dialogue in Doha between Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri and Afghan Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi, reflect a calculated strategy by New Delhi. India’s goals are clear: to ensure Afghan soil is not used to threaten its security and to strengthen trade and connectivity links to and through Iran and Central Asia. This strategic realignment demonstrates India’s ability to adapt its foreign policy to new realities, even with adversarial regimes.
Bangladesh and Pakistan: Old Enemies, New Friends
One is surprised to see Bangladesh’s warming ties with Pakistan. Given the historical rivalry and animosity stemming from the 1971 Liberation War of Bangladesh, one could not have believed the developing cosy relationship between the two countries. In fact, under the interim leadership of Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus, one can see a surge of anti-India sentiment in Bangladesh. For instance, the release of members of Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami, lifting the ban on its activities and easing legal pressures on former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia and her political party have signalled a pivot in Dhaka’s foreign policy.
After Sheikh Hasina left Bangladesh to take refuge in India, Dhaka showed signs of drifting away from India, its traditional ally. Yunus’s government has loosened visa rules for Pakistanis, resumed Pakistani cargo ship docking, and engaged in high-level meetings with Pakistani officials, including a significant encounter with Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif at the D-8 summit in Cairo on December 19, 2024.
Lieutenant General S M Kamr-ul-Hassan, Principal Staff Officer of Bangladesh's Armed Forces Division and second in military command has become the first high-ranking Bangladeshi general to visit Islamabad in years.
Lt-Gen Hassan, accompanied by senior Bangladesh army officials, is making the visit amid evolving relations between Bangladesh and Pakistan. The visit signals a potential shift in the dynamic between the two nations, highlighting renewed diplomatic and military engagement after years of strained ties. It should alert India.
Even though this rapprochement for many political observers is seen as temporary and false, that helps a section of the society who have always remained pro-Pakistan in Bangladesh and ant-liberation war. Sheikh Hasina’s tenure as Bangladeshi Prime Minister in the last ten years has ensured a strong India-Bangladesh partnership, resolved border disputes, and fostered economic ties.
This present shift has practical implications for regional security as one believes that Bangladesh's instability may lead the intelligence agencies of other countries to solidify their positions, more so of Pakistan and China, who continue to increase their foothold in the country.
Another development, the commutation of the Assam separatist group, ULFA chief’s life sentence in Bangladesh, has raised concerns in India about renewed insurgent activity in its northeastern states.
In all these shifting sands, India continues to maintain a "wait and watch" approach; it remains cautious about the potential resurgence of cross-border terrorism and narco smuggling or terrorism and the impact on trade and water-sharing agreements. India so far has opted for restraint in its response to Bangladesh’s shifting stance, banking on the inevitability of economic and geographic realities.
For example, Bangladesh’s textile industry, heavily reliant on Indian transportation, energy and partially raw materials, faces challenges due to ongoing political turmoil. India’s political analysts believe that it is just a question of time as practical considerations, such as trade dependencies and shared challenges like natural disasters, will eventually draw Bangladesh back into closer alignment with New Delhi.
Not far off example is that of Maldives. India's patience and willingness not to put any direct sanctions or limitations on it helped India regain its position and relationship with the Maldives.
India’s broader regional strategy in South Asia emphasizes development assistance and infrastructural investments, with over $33 billion allocated to South Asia in the last decade.
This stands, however, in stark contrast to China’s $840 billion Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) investments. However, China’s investments have often been criticised for creating debt dependencies. At the same time, India’s approach has focused on cultural, historical, and emotional similarities and links, sustainable development, and local partnerships, highlighting its long-term vision for regional stability.
India-Pakistan Rivalry and Caveat
The evolving alliances in South Asia cannot be divorced from the overarching India-Pakistan rivalry. The caveat here is that both nations will keep trying to vie to regain influence in Afghanistan and Bangladesh, their old friends, respectively. Pakistan’s engagement with Bangladesh provides Islamabad with a strategic advantage near India’s northeastern borders. India should remain worried on this front.
Similarly, Pakistan will continue to regain influence with the Taliban on religion and past history, even though India’s outreach to the Taliban reflects its determination to counter Pakistan’s influence in Afghanistan to misuse their land for terrorist activities. These moves, while significant, will continue enduring India-Pakistan competition in South Asia’s geopolitics.
China’s Watchful Eye
One should also not ignore China's presence in South Asia, even though it is not a part of South Asia. China’s proxy presence in India's neighbouring countries must be closely monitored so that third countries do not take advantage of the shifting alliances in South Asia.
China's decades old “string of pearls” strategy aims at encircling India through economic and military partnerships. China attempts to increase its foothold and shape its business with countries like Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and the Maldives. China's presence in the Indian Ocean through these countries has always worried India and other developed countries in the Indo-Pacific region. China’s Belt and Road Initiatives in the name of infrastructure projects and financial incentives have deepened its influence in the respective South Asian countries, often at the expense of India’s traditional dominance.
However, China’s aggressive tactics, including debt-trap diplomacy, have led to pushback in some quarters. The latest two examples are of Sri Lanka and Maldives, now taking a cautious step forward. Both Maldives and Sri Lanka, heavily indebted to China, have begun seeking alternatives to reduce their financial vulnerabilities.
Meanwhile, India reaches these countries with a development-centric approach or acts as a first responder in times of crisis or emergencies. For example, India provided aid during the COVID-19 pandemic and support at the time of natural disasters. It has helped India bolster its image as a reliable partner in times of need, in contrast to China’s transactional approach. India supported Sri Lanka in its ongoing economic recovery during the crisis.
2025 and Road Ahead
As 2025 unfolds, South Asia is poised for further transformations. There will be several key factors that will shape the region's future.
Elections in Bangladesh and Pakistan in 2025 could redefine their foreign policies. Chances are that if pro-Pakistan forces gain power in Dhaka, as one can see in the preparation for allowing the Bangladesh National Party to participate in elections, India may face increased challenges in managing its northeastern border.
Meanwhile, if Pakistan elections happen in 2025, a more pragmatic leadership victory could open doors for renewed trade and dialogue with India.
Bangladesh's mature leadership and diaspora understand its reliance on India for trade and infrastructure. With India's patience and wait-and-watch policy, chances are that the relationship between India and Bangladesh may be regained.
Regional Cooperation: Organizations like SAARC, often hamstrung by India-Pakistan tensions, have the potential to facilitate collaborative solutions to shared challenges such as climate change, disaster management, and regional connectivity. Revitalising these platforms will require concerted efforts from all member states.
The India-China competition will continue to influence South Asia’s geopolitics. India’s focus on strengthening its strategic partnerships with countries like Bhutan, Nepal, Sri Lanka and the Maldives will be crucial in countering China’s expanding footprint. Will China be able to sustain and increase its BRI investments in South Asia when global economic uncertainties continue, remains a debatable question.
The year 2025 looks like an active and promising one for South Asia. As the region navigates a complex web of alliances, rivalries, and external influences, India’s strategic patience and development-focused approach will be tested against Pakistan and China’s relentless pursuit of influence in the region.