Return of Caste

By including caste in the census, it is perhaps the first time since 1931 that caste have been included in the upcoming census. By making this announcement, the Modi government has triggered a seismic shift in governance, politics, and society. It means it will not only benefit the political organisations in the forthcoming elections but also support reshaping welfare, redrawing political strategies, and reigniting debates and deliberations on representation, reservation, and the perils of identity politics.

Rahul Gandhi, in a hurriedly organised press conference, shortly after the announcement, hailed it as a “victory of the Opposition,” claiming that the ruling BJP had been politically compelled to concede what it had resisted for years. Yet, political analysts feel that in turning the tables, the BJP has not only co-opted a key opposition demand but also reclaimed control over the process and its outcomes.

On April 30, Union Minister Ashwini Vaishnaw declared that the Cabinet had approved caste enumeration as part of the upcoming decennial Census. Unlike state-led surveys, conducted with uneven transparency, this move places caste data collection under the central government’s jurisdiction. The decision in itself is a departure from the BJP’s formal stance in Parliament just four years ago, when it had rejected the need for such enumeration. The last time India officially collected caste data in a nationwide Census was in 1931, during British India rule. Although the 2011 Socio-Economic and Caste Census (SECC) gathered similar information, its caste component was never published, citing data inconsistencies.

Why this natters now

The political stakes are clear. In the run-up to Bihar’s caste survey, pre-state elections, it became a rallying point for the Opposition. Rahul Gandhi’s slogan, “jitni aabadi, utna haq” (rights in proportion to population), gained traction in states with large backward caste populations. For months, regional parties like the RJD, JD(U), SP, and Congress had pressed for caste enumeration as a tool to better target welfare and address representation imbalances.

The BJP’s endorsement now appears as much a political manoeuvre as a policy decision. By placing the Census within the Union list under Article 246 of the Constitution, the Modi government has reasserted central control over what was becoming a state-led narrative. The timing and framing allow the BJP to argue that it is not the Congress or regional parties demand but is acting decisively on a longstanding BJP and its allies demand. In doing so, it recasts a potential liability into a strategic asset. Caste, as we all know, is in the DNA of Indians, rather South Asians. It has long shaped Indian society, but its formal documentation has remained taboo in post-Independence governance. Jawaharlal Nehru believed that caste enumeration would reinforce social divisions, and successive governments followed suit. Yet, caste has never vanished from public life. Affirmative action, electoral strategies, favouritism and everyday social hierarchies have kept it always relevant in one shape or another.

The Mandal Commission’s recommendations in the 1980s reignited the issue by introducing 27% reservations for Other Backward Classes (OBCs) in central jobs and education. But the lack of reliable population data complicated implementation. The estimates on records still remain speculative without any Census data of the OBC population that vary widely from 41% to over 50% and remain a political challenge, and many times difficult to implement schemes on the ground. In 1992, the Supreme Court’s nine-judge bench in the Indra Sawhney case introduced a constraint in their ruling that reservations should not exceed 50%, barring exceptional circumstances. Since then, attempts by various states to breach this ceiling have been struck down by courts, even as justices acknowledged the urgent need for updated data on backwardness and under-representation. Now holding caste census will be more than a demographic exercise. It is perhaps the evidentiary basis for reshaping affirmative action.

For the BJP, the caste census represents both an opportunity and a risk. On one hand, it enables the party to solidify its hold over large segments of the non-dominant OBC population, groups like Nishads, Nonia, Kushwahas, and others who have not historically been courted by Mandal-era parties. It also allows the BJP to appear responsive to demands for social justice, potentially outflanking the opposition in its own rhetorical terrain.

For the BJP, this decision comes with some challenges and costs. The party’s upper-caste support may not feel comfortable with this decision. A section of the population and BJP supporters may see it as reservation politics that again will reopen or threaten to reopen old anxieties about merit and fairness. Some even say that an attempt to reunite Hinduism will again get divided. Another fear is that if the new census reveals some discrepancies between perceived and actual caste populations, fear is that demands for revised quotas will follow. The BJP may soon find itself navigating pressures to breach the judicially mandated 50% reservation ceiling. It will be a tightrope walk.

What helps the Modi government strategically is that by spearheading the caste Census itself, the Modi government ensures it will own both the data and the narrative. This allows the BJP to pre-empt regional parties from monopolising the discourse around caste justice. However, it also risks energising rivals. The opposition, including the Congress and regional parties may use the data to demand restructured welfare policies and enhanced representation, claims that could disrupt the BJP’s finely balanced social coalitions, as well as may bring in a new rift between the population of quota and non-quota base.

Challenges

India’s caste landscape is extraordinarily complex, with more than 4,000 recognised groups and many more claimed and unrecognised identities. These are not always mutually understandable or hierarchically consistent across states. Standardising these identities into coherent data will require rigorous work on the ground and professionals who will first need extensive training and a transparent verification mechanism. One will also need to learn lessons on why 2011 SECC, was widely criticised for errors ranging from duplicate entries to incomplete records, and hence was not included or accepted. If the upcoming exercise is to avoid similar pitfalls, it will need significant institutional investment in both capacity and credibility and hiring people with neutrality. Moreover, the legal stakes are high. Should the caste data trigger a call for expanded reservations, the 50% ceiling laid down by the Indra Sawhney case will face renewed scrutiny. States like Tamil Nadu and Bihar have already demanded its revision. Any attempt to legislate around or override this cap could invite judicial review and potential constitutional confrontation.

The immediate concern is political weaponisation. The release of caste data, more so, months ahead of Bihar elections, followed by some other states and future elections could intensify identity-based mobilisation. Competing groups may begin lobbying for greater quotas, more representation in bureaucracy, public and private companies or targeted welfare schemes. While such demands are not new, the availability of official data could lend them fresh legitimacy and urgency. The State of Bihar had already conducted the survey, and it will be compared with the new caste census, as and when it happens. How South India is going to react will be another challenge.

Social cohesion may also come under strain. A poorly handled enumeration process, or one perceived to favour certain groups, could deepen social tensions. To mitigate this, the government must ensure the process is seen as impartial and inclusive. In this census process, all eyes will be on how much civil society will be involved, and how independent and neutral the census teams will be. One of the suggestions is that caste-neutral coding systems may help build public confidence.

Despite the risks, a credible caste census represents a step forward for India’s democracy. It is a recognition that governing a complex society requires confronting uncomfortable realities rather than ignoring them. Policies rooted in guesswork or speculations or on old data when population has doubled in the country and technology has become part of everyday life, can no longer suffice when data-driven governance is within reach. If executed with integrity, the caste census could enable more targeted and equitable welfare schemes. It could provide a factual basis for rethinking affirmative action, beyond the binaries of pro- or anti-reservation. And it could help India move toward a more evidence-based model of policymaking. However, the long-term impact will depend not just on collecting the data but also on how it is used and not weaponised for petty political gains. If treated as a tool for inclusive development, the caste census could redefine India’s social contract. However, the fear is that if political parties are going to use it as a political cudgel, then it could further create a cavity, divisions and complicate further consensus.

Conclusion

The inclusion of caste in the census is both a political masterstroke and a high-stakes policy experiment wedded with risks. In the short-term gains, the inclusion of caste in census grants the ruling BJP a narrative advantage and a new lever of social engineering, while also reviving an issue that has historically upended party fortunes. For the opposition, it is both a vindication, a victory, and a challenge: the data may validate longstanding demands, but it also compels a rethinking of existing caste-based strategies. India now stands at a crossroads. It can either use this opportunity to build a more equitable, data-informed republic or slide further into identity-based contestation. The act of counting castes is not fundamentally divisive; it is the politics of what follows that will decide the future.

Author is National Editor,

Greater Kashmir