Power, Politics, and Public Trust

Reliable, affordable, and uninterrupted electricity is the backbone of any modern society. It powers industry and commerce, enables education, supports healthcare systems, and anchors overall economic development. Yet it remains a striking irony that Jammu and Kashmir—once a hydropower pioneer in the subcontinent with the commissioning of the Mohra Hydel Power Station in 1905—continues to suffer chronic power shortages more than 120 years later.

Despite multiple institutional restructurings—from the erstwhile Power Development Department to the present constellation of power corporations—the fundamental challenge of the widening gap between rising demand and dependable supply remains unchanged.

For nearly 58 years, the Jammu & Kashmir Power Development Department (JKPDD) functioned under direct political control, managing procurement, transmission, and distribution. Tariff decisions were extremely sensitive; even modest increase triggered widespread protests, forcing frequent government rollbacks. As a result, electricity policy became deeply entangled with political considerations, leaving little room for sectoral reforms.

The Jammu & Kashmir State Electricity Regulatory Commission (JKSERC) was established under the J&K State Electricity Regulatory Commission Act, 2000, to bring transparency, rational tariff-setting, and consumer protection to the sector. Empowered to regulate procurement, determine tariffs, and foster efficiency and competition, the Commission attempted to align the state’s electricity framework with national reforms. Its first tariff order was issued for the year 2007–08.

Yet, beyond issuing regulations and periodic tariff orders, the Commission underperformed on its core responsibilities. It failed to enforce mandated annual reductions in AT&C (Aggregate Technical & Commercial) losses. Complaints of poor voltage, frequent outages, and inadequate grievance redressal persisted across Jammu and Kashmir. Most glaringly, the Commission did little to address unsafe working conditions for linemen and field staff—despite the direct relationship between workforce safety and service reliability.

Over time, the institution came to be viewed as a rehabilitation platform for retired bureaucrats and technocrats, raising serious questions about independence and accountability. With quasi-judicial powers but limited on-ground impact, JKSERC struggled to translate statutory mandates into tangible improvements.

I vividly recall the Commission’s first public hearing at the IMPA complex in Srinagar, in 2006, convened to examine a tariff-hike petition filed by the Power Development Department. Representing the Federation of Chambers of Industries Kashmir (FCIK), I presented a detailed rebuttal to the Utility’s claims. At the time, the Department had reported 47% AT&C losses. In response, the Commission ordered that these losses be reduced by 5% annually to reach 25%. Nearly two decades later, KPDCL reportedly remains stuck around the same 47% loss level—proof that directives, without enforcement, become little more than paperwork.

Public participation in such hearings was minimal. Most consumers were unaware of their rights, and business associations largely stayed away. FCIK remained one of the few consistent voices challenging faulty data and blocking several unjustified proposals.

Following the J&K Re-organisation Act, 2019, JKSERC was dissolved and replaced with a Joint Electricity Regulatory Commission (JERC) for J&K and Ladakh in 2020. The power sector was simultaneously unbundled into separate corporations for transmission and distribution, with KPDCL and JPDCL envisioned as financially autonomous entities akin to DISCOMs elsewhere.

But true financial autonomy never materialised. The corporations still rely heavily on government budgetary support for salaries, deficit financing, and capital works.

In the five years since its formation, JERC has yet to demonstrate meaningful progress. Tariff increases have been readily approved, but improvements in consumer service, loss reduction, and accountability remain elusive.

A telling example came in 2023, when the government withdrew the 15% Electricity Duty (ED) as part of GST reforms aimed at eliminating cascading taxes. Instead of passing the benefit to consumers, KPDCL and JPDCL sought a 15% tariff increase, arguing that consumers were already paying the equivalent amount as ED. This move effectively nullified the intended relief. The government removed a distortionary tax; the Utilities sought its reintroduction through tariffs. Despite strong objections from trade bodies and civil society, JERC approved the increase.

This manipulation has now resurfaced with even greater intensity, after KPDCL and JPDCL proposed a 20% surcharge during peak hours (6–9 AM and 5/6–9/10 PM), claiming it would flatten the load curve and ease winter pressure on the grid. But for people enduring Kashmir’s severe winters, consumption during these hours is not discretionary—it is essential for heating, cooking, and survival. Unsurprisingly, the proposal has triggered widespread public and political opposition.

What makes the situation particularly striking is the ruling party’s decision to distance itself from the proposal, insisting that such a surcharge will not be allowed—even though both corporations operate under full government control and rely almost entirely on government funding. It is difficult to believe such a petition was submitted without administrative awareness or tacit approval. If the government now disowns the proposal, it must clarify how it bypassed scrutiny and whether corrective action will be taken against those responsible.

The proposed 20% peak-hour surcharge suffers from significant technical shortcomings. KPDCL has failed to present any foundational data to justify the hike. There is no load research, marginal cost analysis, or demand curve modeling to demonstrate that costs during peak hours are materially higher. Without such evidence, the claim that a 20% surcharge reflects actual peak-hour costs is unsubstantiated. Moreover, the absence of widespread functional smart meters or a fully operational AMI (Advanced Metering Infrastructure) makes accurate peak-hour billing technically infeasible. Simply put, the system lacks the tools needed to measure and bill peak-hour consumption reliably.

From an economic perspective, the proposal is equally flawed. Winter electricity demand in Jammu and Kashmir is largely inelastic; households depend on power for essential heating and basic survival. These critical needs cannot be shifted to off-peak hours. Imposing a steep surcharge does not “flatten the load curve”; it merely burdens consumers who have no practical alternative.

The surcharge also raises serious procedural and policy concerns. Essential components of Time-of-Day tariff design—consumer impact assessments, elasticity studies, and tariff shock analyses—have not been conducted or disclosed. These assessments are crucial to ensure that new tariffs are fair, transparent, and do not disproportionately affect vulnerable populations. By bypassing them, the proposal undermines regulatory due process.

Finally, the surcharge shifts the burden of systemic inefficiencies onto consumers rather than addressing the root causes. High AT&C losses, overloaded feeders, and derated transformers continue to plague the network. A surcharge treats the symptom - peak demand; rather than the disease - structural weaknesses in the distribution system. Without targeted investments in infrastructure, grid modernisation, and demand-side management, such a policy will fail to improve reliability and instead deepen public mistrust.

More equitable and effective alternatives exist: upgrading transformers, modernising feeders, strengthening forecasting, implementing demand-side management programmes, and accelerating AMI (Advanced Metering Infrastructure) rollout. These measures would reduce peak stress far more effectively than punitive charges on households.

In light of these facts, the Joint Electricity Regulatory Commission must recognise that its credibility is at stake. Endorsing an irrational and poorly substantiated demand from the corporations would further erode public trust. The Commission’s role is not to approve utility requests by default but to uphold transparency, protect consumers, and base tariff decisions on sound evidence. By rejecting the surcharge proposal and aligning its stance with technical merit and public sentiment, the Commission can reaffirm its independence, safeguard its reputation, and demonstrate that the voices of the people - especially during J&K’s severe winters - truly matter.

At the same time, the government must act decisively. Withdrawing the surcharge petition is not merely an administrative correction - it is a political necessity and a moral imperative. Doing so would shield citizens from an unjustified financial burden, restore public confidence, and affirm that essential winter needs will not be compromised by ill-conceived proposals. A clear and proactive withdrawal would signal responsible governance and refocus attention on what truly matters: building a reliable, accountable, and consumer-centric power sector for Jammu and Kashmir.

Shakeel Qalander, prominent business leader and a civil society animator