Pakistan’s Kashmir Strategy in Decline
For decades, Pakistan has sought to internationalize the Kashmir issue, presenting itself as the guardian of Kashmiri rights. Its campaigns have evolved from traditional diplomacy to high-decibel social media activism, and more recently, to diaspora-driven lobbying in Western capitals. However, the last few years reveal a striking decline in Pakistan’s ability to shape the global narrative on Kashmir. The collapse of its flagship digital initiative, Youm-e-Istehsal (Day of Exploitation), and its increasing reliance on diaspora activists like Raja Fahim Kayani highlight both the limitations of Pakistan’s strategy and the growing rejection of its role by authentic Kashmiri voices themselves.
This article examines the transformation of Pakistan’s Kashmir advocacy between 2022 and 2025, the reasons behind its digital failure, the role of diaspora fronts, and why both approaches are increasingly unsustainable.
The Rise and Fall of Youm-e-Istehsal
Origins of the Campaign: In 2019, after India revoked Article 370, Pakistan declared August 5 as Youm-e-Istehsal. The day was intended to symbolize “resistance” to India’s constitutional changes and to project Pakistan as the global defender of Kashmiri rights. Social media became the battleground: hashtags, mass-tweeting, graphics, and video appeals aimed to trend worldwide, creating the illusion of a global outcry.
Peak and Decline
The 2022 campaign represented the zenith of this strategy. Pakistan deployed nine diverse hashtags, covering emotional, legal, territorial, and multilingual angles. It generated some international activity across the UK, Thailand, and parts of South Asia. For a brief period, it appeared that Pakistan’s digital narrative was gaining traction.
But from 2023 onwards, the campaign declined rapidly:
2023: Hashtags dropped to four, international participation shrank by 60%, and content became repetitive.
2024: Coordination collapsed entirely. The peak tweeting occurred on August 6, not August 5. International engagement almost disappeared, with only embassies and bots active.
2025: Despite tighter timing, the campaign collapsed into artificial amplification. With only 710 tweets compared to over 2,000 in 2022, participation was largely limited to fake accounts. Engagement ratios 2.53 retweets per tweet but only 0.54 replies—exposed bot networks rather than genuine discourse.
The decline of Youm-e-Istehsal reveals three fundamental weaknesses:
Over-reliance on artificial amplification rather than organic support.
Geographic isolation, as campaigns resonated only in Pakistan and failed to capture global attention.
Absence of authentic Kashmiri voices, leaving the campaign hollow and delegitimized.
Shift Toward Diaspora Activism
As the digital campaign faltered, Pakistan increasingly shifted resources to diaspora networks, especially in the United Kingdom. Here, activists like Raja Fahim Kayani became central figures in sustaining Pakistan’s narrative.
Raja Fahim Kayani and Tehreek-e-Kashmir UK
Kayani, president of Tehreek-e-Kashmir UK, organizes regular protests outside the Indian High Commission in London. Timed with Indian national days, these protests serve dual purposes: they generate Pakistani media coverage (portraying “global solidarity”) and provide networking platforms for separatist activists.
Kayani also coordinates with European chapters, making him a hub for Pakistan-linked advocacy across the continent. His role extends beyond street protests—he acts as spokesperson, fundraiser, and liaison between diaspora activists and Pakistani officials.
Al-Khidmat Foundation UK – The Charitable Front
Alongside political activism, Kayani is linked with Al-Khidmat Foundation UK, a charity with affiliations to Jamaat-e-Islami. While presenting itself as humanitarian, Al-Khidmat has a history of controversial ties, including its 2006 declaration of funding Hamas. By operating under charitable cover, Pakistan-linked activists enjoy legal protection, tax benefits, and access to mainstream political circles in the West.
Connections to Pakistani State and Intelligence
Kayani’s meetings with senior Pakistani officials including the Chief Minister of Gilgit-Baltistan in 2025 illustrate his close coordination with Islamabad. His operational model resembles that of Ghulam Nabi Fai, a convicted ISI agent in the US. Both used diaspora platforms, charitable covers, and political advocacy to advance Pakistan’s intelligence agenda.
Expanding the Network: From Kashmir to Khalistan
A striking feature of Kayani’s activism is its coordination with Khalistan separatist groups. Joint protests and statements with organizations like the World Sikh Parliament project an illusion of solidarity across minority causes. In reality, this alliance amplifies anti-India narratives in Western democracies while exaggerating separatist sentiment.
The collaboration between Kashmiri and Khalistani activists demonstrates how Pakistan seeks to bundle disparate causes under one anti-India umbrella, regardless of their limited grassroots resonance.
Why the Strategy is Failing
Despite its shift from digital to diaspora advocacy, Pakistan’s Kashmir strategy continues to struggle.
- Digital Collapse: Youm-e-Istehsal has degenerated into bot-driven irrelevance. With no organic engagement, the campaign has lost credibility both internationally and domestically.
- Diaspora Isolation: Events organized by activists like Kayani attract almost exclusively Pakistani-origin participants in the UK. Kashmiri-origin communities, whom Pakistan claims to represent, are conspicuously absent. This exposes the manufactured nature of such activism.
- Authentic Kashmiri Rejection: Perhaps the biggest challenge is from real Kashmiris themselves. Figures like Javed Ahmad Beigh, an ethnic Kashmiri Muslim, have publicly rejected Pakistan’s claims of representation. In an open letter to Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, Beigh accused Pakistan of exploiting Kashmir for its survival as a “hateful security state.” His criticism, rooted in Kashmiri identity, undercuts Pakistan’s entire narrative.
- Erosion of International Legitimacy: Western governments and media are increasingly aware of Pakistan’s reliance on diaspora fronts with questionable affiliations. The historical precedent of Ghulam Nabi Fai has made authorities more cautious about such activism, reducing its effectiveness.
The Bigger Picture: Pakistan’s Strategic Dilemma
Pakistan’s Kashmir policy reveals a broader dilemma. Its attempts to weaponize social media and diaspora lobbying have failed to generate international legitimacy. Instead, they have exposed Pakistan’s dependence on artificial amplification, radical networks, and diaspora manipulation.
Meanwhile, India’s position grounded in constitutional changes and governance initiatives in Jammu & Kashmir—has steadily consolidated. Internationally, India has framed its actions as internal matters, while highlighting Pakistan’s use of extremist groups and propaganda as destabilizing factors.
For Pakistan, this creates a dangerous paradox: the more it tries to amplify Kashmir internationally, the more it risks exposure of its covert networks and weakening credibility.
Between 2022 and 2025, Pakistan’s Kashmir advocacy has undergone a profound transformation—but not for the better. The collapse of its digital campaign Youm-e-Istehsal and the increasing reliance on diaspora activists like Raja Fahim Kayani reflect a strategy in retreat. While bots and hashtags have failed to resonate, diaspora protests remain confined to Pakistani communities abroad, devoid of authentic Kashmiri participation.
Most damaging of all, genuine Kashmiri voices are now openly rejecting Pakistan’s claims of representation, exposing the hollowness of its decades-long narrative. The credibility gap between Pakistan’s rhetoric and Kashmiri realities has never been wider.
Ultimately, whether through digital platforms or diaspora fronts, Pakistan’s efforts suffer from the same fatal flaw: they attempt to speak on behalf of a people who are no longer willing to let Islamabad speak for them. Unless Pakistan rethinks its strategy fundamentally—by acknowledging Kashmiri agency rather than exploiting it—its international campaigns will continue to collapse under the weight of their own contradictions.
By: Dr. Shujaat Ali Quadri
(The Author is the National Chairman of Muslim Students Organisation of India MSO, he writes on a wide range of issues, including, Sufism, Public Policy, Geopolitics and Information Warfare.)
