New World Order: West and the Rest

Writings on the New World Order have become a staple for students and policy analysts engaged in diplomacy and international relations. These writings range from books and research papers to serious newspaper articles. Ram Madhav, President of the India Foundation, recently wrote: Wake Up to the New World Order (Indian Express (June 28, 2025). Similarly, The Economist (June 18, 2020) observed the emergence of a “New World Disorder.” Earlier, Henry Kissinger predicted that the coronavirus pandemic would forever alter the world order.

Amitav Acharya, Distinguished Professor of International Relations at American University, Washington, has recently published a new book: The Once and Future World Order: Why Global Civilization Will Survive the Decline of the West. Acharya argues that while many scholars view the Western-led world order as broadly positive—providing stability to the international system—they remain sceptical of a non-Western-led order as a viable alternative. He challenges this view, contending that such a characterization is exaggerated. The West itself, he maintains, has contributed significantly to instability, injustice, and disorder—ills that may only diminish with its relative decline.

Acharya reminds us that for most of history, China, the Islamic world, and India have been powerful actors shaping world affairs and may once again provide possibilities for the future. “There was a world before the West,” he writes, “and there will be another after it.” He thus builds a case for a world of West with the Rest rather than West versus the Rest. Instead of fearing the future, the West must learn from history and cooperate with the rest of the world to forge a fairer and more equitable order.

Understanding World Order

“World order” refers to the political, economic, and social arrangements that define global affairs at any given time. For Acharya, it signifies peace and stability—akin to the modern concept of law-and-order writ large. It also denotes the organizational structures—political and economic—through which nations interact. To grasp any world order, one must examine power structures, economic linkages, and the role of international leadership in ensuring stability and peace. Acharya outlines four key dimensions:

World order encompasses both empires and sovereign states.

It need not cover the entire globe; it can exist within a single civilization, region, or across multiple regions.

World orders do not emerge or function in isolation.

Stability remains a defining feature of world order.

This review of Acharya’s book appears at a moment in international relations when, to borrow a Chinese proverb, there is “a lot of noise on the stairs, but no one in the room.” The West refuses to fade away, yet the Rest has not assumed leadership of global affairs. In 1957, Mao Zedong declared that “the East wind will prevail over the West.” Yet today, leaders like Donald Trump unilaterally reshape global trade, with countries queuing for access to U.S. markets. Trump proved particularly difficult for India, openly asserting that trade would be used as a tool to bend nations to Washington’s will, while also threatening India over its relations with Russia, Iran, and membership in BRICS.

Acharya envisions not an order of imposed norms but one of negotiated consensus—a confluence of civilizations. He interprets the rise of non-Western actors not as a crisis but as an opportunity to construct a fairer and more representative system. While the West has contributed innovations in democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and rationalism, Acharya stresses that many concepts of peace, morality, and cooperation originated in non-Western civilizations long before the rise of the West. In his view, the decline of the West is not a disaster but potentially beneficial in the long term, given that Western dominance has often been associated with inequality, racism, and wars—usually fought in the Global South. He advances what he calls a “back-to-the-future” thesis: that a more balanced multipolar world order may revive the pluralism of earlier eras.

Debates and Critiques

Not all scholars fully agree with Acharya’s vision. Strategic studies expert C. Raja Mohan finds Acharya’s arguments persuasive but incomplete. He notes that while the West faces challenges, the East does not present a uniformly optimistic picture—being marred by authoritarianism, populism, and violent identity politics rooted in religion, caste, and language. China, in particular, has struggled to integrate its ethnic minorities.

Mohan acknowledges Acharya’s critique of the West but emphasizes that the legacy of Western civilization—rooted in the rule of law, rationalism, science, individual liberty, and secular politics—has shaped societies for centuries in unprecedented ways. Despite criticism, Western soft power continues to attract talent from across the globe. This raises an important question: in the contest between the West and the Rest, what options remain for a major power like India?

India in the New Order

Ram Madhav urges India to recalibrate its global engagements, moving beyond Cold War-era frameworks and adopting a multidimensional approach with clearly defined end goals. In India’s Great Power Delusions (Foreign Affairs, June 17, 2025), Ashley J. Tellis describes India as a significant conventional power in South Asia but notes that its advantages are limited. He warns that India’s “illiberal pivot” risks undermining the very rules-based international order that has served it well.

China’s economic trajectory offers a sharp contrast: from economic parity with India in 1980, China’s economy has grown to nearly five times India’s size today. This reflects the cautious yet strategic guidance of Deng Xiaoping, who urged China to “secure its position, hide its potential, and bide its time.” Brajesh Mishra, in advising Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, offered a similar principle: “For thirty years, don’t provoke and don’t get provoked.”

For India to secure a respectable place in the world order, two priorities stand out:

Regional Primacy – India must consolidate its position in its immediate and extended neighbourhood. Without enduring influence in its own region, no nation can emerge as a global power.

Growth over Grievance – No country has advanced by prioritizing historical grievances over economic growth. A 21st-century economy cannot be driven by medieval animosities.

India must separate politics from prejudice, ensure institutional neutrality, and promote cosmopolitanism. Only then can it aspire to become a Vishwa guru (world teacher). All other paths lead to failure.

Professor Gull Wani is Kashmir based Political Scientist and Honorary Senior Fellow Centre for Multilevel Federalism New Delhi.