Myanmar: Whose war is it?

South Asia is fraught with endless ethnic and socio-economic strife, power struggles in Pakistan, Bangladesh’s unstable interim government, Sri-Lanka in a difficult reconstruction phase, and Myanmar remains a forgotten episode. Despite the nature of the conflict that will shape the future of stability in the region.

On February 1st, 2021, Myanmar’s powerful Military Junta—Tatmadav, staged a coup, ending a decade of fragile democratic transition. The democracy icon—Aung San Suu Kyi and her National League for Democracy (NLD), unceremoniously dethroned. The military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) lost the elections, signifying the dislike by the electorate, and cried fraud. This marked the return of Military rule, hinted at by its Army general just 3 days before on 28th January. This saw the brutal crackdown on pro-democracy leaders, bloodshed on the streets, protests, and a fragile political compromise—a compromise hardwired into the 2008 constitution that gave the army a permanent veto in governance, immunity from audits, and a quarter of seats in parliament reserved for men in uniform.

The Long Shadow of the Military

Since independence in 1948, Myanmar’s generals have claimed a special role in “keeping the country united.” Ethnic nationalism was strong from the beginning, and the Tatmadaw positioned itself as the only force capable of preventing fragmentation. This logic has allowed it to dominate politics for decades. Events in 1962, when it seized power, and adopted the so-called Burmese Way to Socialism. This cast shadows on any democratic endeavor and, far from prosperity, created shortages, corruption, and black markets. In 1988, when civil and ethnic strife reached its climax, with the economy of the country stagnating and receding, it led to an uprising and inevitably bloodshed at the hands of its Army junta. Even though it gave the country Aung San Suu Kyi, the face of democratic resistance. The Saffron Revolution led by Buddhist monks over skyrocketing fuel prices in 2007 met the same fate. This, after the Army itself promised a roadmap to democracy in 2003!. It was in 2008, a new constitution institutionalised multiparty politics but gave the Army veto on key governance issues. In 2010, Suu Kyi was released, and by 2011, the junta announced the end of direct military rule, only to return later and keep tampering with the democratic government and public mandate. In 2015, Myanmar held its first genuinely free election. The NLD swept to power with a brutal mandate.

In 2021, the real clash came when Suu Kyi’s government pushed to amend the constitution and get away with the army’s reserved seats, which the Tatmadaw struck back. This marked the end of another chapter of democratic rule in the country and hence the beginning of a new civil war.

Myanmar After the Coup: A Country at War

The coup reopened old wounds and unleashed new ones. Myanmar today is in the throes of a full-blown civil war, with 80,000 civilians dead and 3.2 million internally displaced. The junta controls less than 20 percent of the country’s territory, putting a big question mark on its legitimacy.

The Geography of Ethnic War

In the north, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) pushes for full autonomy. In the west, the Arakan Army (AA) demands self-rule in Rakhine. The Chin Brotherhood Alliance and Chinland Council fight in Chin State. In the east, the Karenni forces resist military incursions. Across the plains, the People’s Defense Force (PDF) — loyal to the exiled National Unity Government (NUG) under Duwa Lashi La — has emerged as a popular armed resistance. The Tatmadaw still wields heavy weaponry, airpower, and access to Russian and Chinese arms. The countryside is slipping away, leaving a patchwork of semi-autonomous regions.

Great Powers in Myanmar’s Chessboard

Myanmar’s crisis is not contained within its borders. It has become a playground for great-power competition. For China, with deepest stakes, the country is a strategic gateway to the Indian Ocean, with a 1700 km corridor and an overland access across. While it supplies arms to the junta, it also quietly engages with ethnic groups to protect its investments. Most rebels avoid targeting Chinese projects for fear of losing Beijing’s favor.

For India, Myanmar isn’t just the question of a failed neighbouring state, but it sees the country through the lens of its troubled Northeast. The recent airstrikes conducted in the deepest parts of Myanmar help to understand its security imperative. But India has mostly engaged with the military leadership, unlike China, which plays all sides. This leaves Delhi vulnerable.

Russia is a key arms supplier, selling jets, helicopters, and tanks to the junta. Yet, unlike in Ukraine, Russia and China are not fully aligned here. Both pursue their own strategic equities.

The United States has tread the path cautiously, given the strategic necessity in the region and counter China, casting its lot with the exiled NUG. It has instead urged Thailand to take a more active role. But Washington has recently started renovating a consulate in northern Thailand, Chiang Mai, a move with clear strategic signaling to Beijing and South Asian states. It is also eyeing Cox’s Bazar in Bangladesh as a potential node for projecting influence in the Bay of Bengal.

For Thailand, it isn’t about an immediate neighbour but to balance between Beijing and Washington, and it has chosen caution over confrontation.

Why South Asia Cannot Afford to Ignore Myanmar

For South Asia, Myanmar is not a distant problem. It is a frontline. The Refugee crisis is affecting India, Bangladesh, and Thailand, straining their social fabric and economy, and terror spillover of insurgencies particularly for India, worsening Manipur’s crisis further. It has also shot the ‘Act East Policy’ in the foot, and hampers the regional initiatives like BIMSTEC. Most importantly, it helps China walk past its strategic chokepoints like ‘South China Sea and ‘Malacca Strait easily, and opens another strategic frontline in India’s backyard. If ignored, Myanmar risks becoming South Asia’s version of Ukraine: a theater of displacement, armed conflict, and great-power rivalry.

The Strategic Lesson

South Asia has many loose ends that invite foreign elements to play their games and make the region break free from its regional cooperation and responsibilities. Myanmar isn’t just a domestic struggle between soldiers and its civilians, or a pro and anti democracy contestation; rather, it is an established reality when geopolitics and internal fragility collide. For China, Myanmar is a corridor. For Russia, it is an arms market. For the United States, it is an entry point into mainland Southeast Asia. For India, it is a vulnerability on its eastern flank. The risk is that Myanmar becomes not just a broken state but also the trigger point for a deeper regional contest.