Missing links in the chain

Some fundamentals of the counter-terrorism strategies in Jammu and Kashmir have changed over the years, and so has the narrative. There has been a tectonic shift in anti-terrorism campaign - infuse tremendous fear among the terrorists and their backers.

And still if it is stated that peace is not there as it should have been, this only beckons that these strategies need to be reconfigured. The gaps must be addressed in the real-time basis. Optics and rhetoric have their own significance in such fights but ultimately peace will be possible only when it exists on the ground.

In a conflict zone, like Jammu and Kashmir, which has endured militancy or terrorism, no matter what term is used, exact delivery time of peace can neither be calculated nor announced. The disturbing part is that peace process is getting delayed because there has been a single-minded approach. Guns-only can find a solution to guns wielded by terrorists, though quite effective, but it is not the wholesome.

It is an altogether different ballgame. The gun battles between security forces and the terrorists of foreign origin, or locals, have been going on for the past over three and a half decades. Each effort delivers results. These results are seen in the ever-rising number of terrorists neutralised in the statistics catalogue. That is what the security forces were assigned to achieve. But is that all? No conflict has ever ended with guns falling silent unless backed up by public support.

First lesson, J&K has learnt over the decades, is that never presume that security forces can complete their assigned task and usher in perfect peace. They can achieve all this up to a particular point. Thereafter, threads have to be taken up by polity.

The security forces are trained to fight terrorists in the open and neutralize them. The terrain and extreme weather conditions in this territory made them to change their tactics and achieve good results, but not without making supreme sacrifices.

Technicalities apart, that a soldier should not die unless four terrorists are killed; going by the standard military ratio of one is to four, the fact is that each soldier martyred is a national loss. Each such sacrifice triggers emotions which have an overwhelming impact on polity.

Second lesson is that unless or until the public joins hands, no counter-terrorism strategy can deliver desired results. They can kill terrorists, infuse fear among others but they cannot change the mindset. A soldier tutoring young men about the futility of path of terrorism has its limitations. Uniformed men have their image. Their word, especially to an audience not used to acknowledging them as teachers, evoke split lens image – soldier and teacher not as teacher alone.

Third, mistakes have been committed in the past. There was hesitation in declaring a war on terrorism until Prime Minister Narendra Modi declared it in no uncertain terms. His mantra of zero tolerance of terrorism has worked wonders. Before that denouncing terrorism in explicit terms was considered a blasphemy. There was a fear that condemning terrorism would cost them politically or tag them as a betrayer of the cause. Many were aware of consequences of extremist violence even in 1990 itself, but they were not able to speak. They knew that the violence will ruin the Valley and its culture, but they were afraid of saying it in loud whispers even in private conversations. I remember a professor of political science of extreme insight telling me in the severe winter of 1990 that it is a phase in the march of civilizations; it too shall pass. These were prophetic words.

The people were afraid of one gun only – gun in the hands of men, indoctrinated and trained across the border. They would not listen to reason, and those who had reasoning power and could foresee the consequences, were eliminated by their fellow travellers. A fundamental of fighting terrorism is to declare war against it, and enable society to gain strength to save itself.

There was a complete failure at societal level as also in the politics of the times.

Now, in the year 2025 – there is a realization that after such a relentless and effective campaign against ecosystem of terrorism, the gaps continue to exist. Though a lot many bridges were built, but many more are waiting to be built. Physical bridges have their significance, but the tragedy is that natural disasters can consume them instantly. The lasting bridges are the ones built on emotions. There are missing links which need to be addressed.

The year 2025 has exposed vulnerabilities. Pahalgam attack of April 22 comes to mind, and it has to be, because it has redefined terrorism and counter-terrorism. Operation Sindoor drew new red lines; besides punishing Pakistan and its military and terror assets. But terror modules, thought at a very minuscule level, continue to work. Why it is happening, it has to be reckoned with in all objectivity.

A cardinal principle of fighting terrorism or neutralizing conflict and turning that into peace is to make a right choice of words while making proclamations of war against terrorism. The idea should be to isolate those keeping gunpowder dry, not the whole system.

In this fight, there are no rivals, except the trouble-makers. Peace is not an alien concept. It gains vibrancy with the hearts and minds of people. The ecosystem of peace should be built without any further delay, involving all as no single person and institution can do it by itself. This understanding is must to have perfect peace in homes and the larger environment.