Kashmir: A Cop’s Journey of Career and Calling
After Ali Mohammad Wattali’s memoir, we now receive further insider insights into Kashmir through a book by the former Director General of Jammu and Kashmir Police, Mr. Mahendra Sabharwal, titled Kashmir Under Article 370: A Personal History. His son, Manish, has assisted senior Sabharwal in writing the book. Earlier in his career, Mr. Sabharwal served as District Police Chief of Anantnag and Srinagar and later spent several years in the CRPF, the Intelligence Bureau (IB), and the Cabinet Secretariat.
Books written by police officers who were responsible for handling Kashmir affairs, particularly after 1990, are rich sources of material for those seeking to understand diverse perspectives on the region. According to the author, the abrogation of Article 370 triggered the writing of this book.
As Police Chief between 1993- 1997, Mr. Sabharwal examines “Hazratbal: A Tale of Two Sieges in 1993 and 1996.” Although both situations appeared similar, they were handled differently by the same actors of state structure. In both operations the experiences of Operation Blue Star, the demolition of the Babri Masjid, and the burning of Charar-e-Sharief weighed heavily on the minds of state functionaries and therefore, caution was exercised. The context and memory proved crucial in decision-making, although frustration over the Supreme Court’s order mandating calorie-measured food packets in first siege was strongly felt. It was later realized that these food packets facilitated entry into the shrine and enabled face-to-face interaction with militants.
In the second siege in 1996, the Jammu and Kashmir Police had a trained Special Operations Group (SOG), vital intelligence inputs, and the support of the local population in the Hazratbal area, where extortion and interference in higher education institutions were burdening the local population. These frustrations were leveraged by the security establishment. The militants were offered a security-free corridor to move back to their nearby office from the shrine. The office was later stormed, resulting in the killing of twenty-two militants inside. According to the author, these actions punctured the militants’ aura of invincibility, increased local confidence to participate in subsequent elections, and significantly boosted the morale of the J&K Police.
As a former police officer who worked in various capacities, Mr. Sabharwal demonstrates a fairly good understanding of the regions, cultures, and religions of Jammu and Kashmir. He describes the people of the state as moderate, kind, resilient, and cheerful. While the successors of Maharaja Gulab Singh transformed Kashmir into a “limited-access society” in which power was concentrated among elites, the state’s weak financial position after 1947 explains the crucial—and often dominant—role of the central government in its politics. The removal of special status in 2019, according to Mr. Sabharwal, was crucial to ending the use of “soft separatism” as a profitable local political strategy. At the same time, he advocates for the restoration of statehood and emphasizes the importance of developing a cadre of officers who spend decades cultivating intuitive understanding through long-term engagement in Kashmir rather than serving briefly as “policy tourists.”
Any police officer aspires at some stage of his career to head the force, and in Jammu and Kashmir this role provides insight into the management of Centre–State relations. Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah was released from detention only after India’s victory in the 1971 war, the signing of the Simla Agreement, and the Pokhran nuclear test—developments that strengthened the Indian state’s confidence in addressing Jammu and Kashmir. Mr. Sabharwal regards the Rajiv Gandhi–Farooq Abdullah alliance of 1987 as a political and administrative failure. As Intelligence Chief, he claims to have travelled widely with the two leaders by road and helicopter and observed that they more frequently discussed non-political matters than issues concerning welfare, economics, or terrorism.
Mr. Sabharwal appears to have been disappointed while working with Mr. Jagmohan during his second tenure as Governor of Jammu and Kashmir. Recalling his only meeting at Raj Bhavan, he writes:
“I mentioned hearing open calls at Batamaloo bus stand— ‘Sopore, Kapoor, and Apore’—urging people to travel across the border. Mr. Jagmohan angrily responded, ‘Why don’t you do something and give the BSF and the Army some concrete information?’ He additionally warned me that if he could promote me, he could also demote me.”
Governor Jagmohan and then Police Chief Saksena had limited crowd-handling experience and violated the basic principle of trusting the officer on the front line claims the author. Mr. Jagmohan rarely left Raj Bhavan during his tenure of less than five months. Regarding the bilateral peace process, the author opines that the influential National Security Advisor, Brajesh Mishra, had persuaded Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee that a Nobel Prize might be within reach if he successfully stitched together a peace deal with Pakistan.
Like many Kashmir observers, the author delves into the complex politics of separatism and offers specific insights. He argues that some of Jammu and Kashmir’s troubles stem from national political parties prioritizing party interests over national interests. This aligns with my own assessment that people in Jammu and Kashmir were more anti-Congress (1960–1990) than anti-India, and more anti-BJP (2014–2026) than anti-India. The Party interest and national interest are not synonymous. The Janata Party, under Prime Minister Morarji Desai, ensured fair elections in 1977 in Jammu &Kashmir and the Prime Minister was later curiously honoured with Pakistan’s highest civilian award, Nishan-e-Pakistan. The hosting of an opposition conclave in 1983 by Farooq Abdullah was a powerful democratic message from Kashmir, which immediately clashed with the politics of Congress Party.
Mr. Sabharwal has something revealing to convey about the 1987 election results. He writes that on the day of counting, Farooq Abdullah summoned him to his Gupkar residence, where he was present when Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi called, suggesting that a win for Muslim United Front candidate Mohammad Yusuf Shah—who was leading—could create difficulties for the government and that Farooq should “fix the situation.” The supremacy of party interest over what is called national interest later frightened many Kashmir watchers. The Jammu-based intellectual, the late Balraj Puri, had earlier warned that if power-sharing between the National Conference and the Congress Party occurred despite past rivalries, “Kashmir will go the Punjab way and Farooq will go the Barnala way,” referring to Punjab Chief Minister Surjit Singh Barnala, who had to leave office prematurely. The prognosis proved true.
Mr. Sabharwal retains fond memories of Kashmir and its people and expresses faith in the Jammu and Kashmir Police, established in 1873 with one police officer (Kotwal) and fourteen thanadars (station in-charges) for Srinagar. In 1895, British civil servant Walter Lawrence described the J&K Police as consisting of 1,000 village chowkidars, usually from the Dom caste. The force’s strength in 1890 was 1,040 personnel; by 1944 it had grown to 3,179; today it exceeds 100,000.
The book offers a new perspective and is quite informative. The National Security Advisor Ajit Doval finds it to be a work that offers a fresh perspective on understanding Kashmir better. It is an important reflective account, as stated by historian Srinath Raghavan. There are some minor errors, which will surely be corrected in the next edition of the book.
Prof. Wani is a Kashmir-based political scientist.
