India and China: Bridging Borders, Testing Trust

India and China, the two ancient civilisations, the most populous countries in the world, geopolitical competitors, and rising economic powers, find themselves at an interesting crossroads. India and China have seen five years of icy relations following the Galwan Valley clash in 2020. Recent diplomatic overtures, including External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar’s visit to Beijing last week, and before that, the Defence Minister’s visit to China in June, suggest that the thaw has begun. It marks a high-level Indian visit since the conflict, and the tone in the recent meetings was notably constructive. But real warmth will depend on more than handshakes and symbolism; it will require trust built on tangible actions, especially along the challenged border that remains the principal thorn in the side of this uneasy relationship. And while the focus of Indo-China ties is often bilateral, neighbouring actors like Nepal, Bangladesh, Myanmar are emerging as a significant and sensitive variable in the equation.

Despite some disengagement along friction points in eastern Ladakh, the Line of Actual Control (LAC) remains calm but tense. Around 50,000–60,000 troops are still stationed in high-altitude zones, where hostility simmers beneath the snow. Both countries continue to improve their connectivity in the difficult Himalayan and mountainous terrain, as Jaishankar correctly noted, the broader relationship depends fundamentally on peace at the border. Permanent disengagement, rather than managed confrontation, is the only durable solution. To get there, both countries will need more than patrol agreements. Confidence-building measures, mutual verification, and structured dialogue on de-escalation must continue.

Political will is essential, equally so is the strategic recognition that a frozen conflict on one of the world’s most dangerous frontiers benefits neither nation. Bilateral trade has crossed $100 billion annually, but the relationship is skewed and fragile. India is concerned about its widening trade deficit with China, as well as Beijing’s recent restrictions on rare earth exports. China, for its part, has also viewed Indian data and investment regulations with suspicion. While calls for “de-risking” and “self-reliance” are popular in both capitals, decoupling is neither feasible nor desirable. Instead, creating robust institutional channels to address trade frictions, technology flows, and supply chains could help stabilise this crucial leg of the relationship.

China’s expansive Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) continues to cast a long shadow over South Asia, directly affecting India’s core strategic interests. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) continues to remain a concern for New Delhi on one hand in western borders, while BRI-linked infrastructure is quietly encroaching near India’s eastern borders, near the vulnerable Siliguri corridor through projects in Nepal, Bangladesh and Myanmar. Nowhere is this encroachment more consequential and worrying than in Nepal and Bangladesh, where China’s growing presence increasingly tests India’s traditional influence.

When Nepali Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli chose Beijing, not Delhi, for his first bilateral visit after returning to office in December 2024, it signalled more than a protocol breach. It reflected the shifting sands of power in South Asia. Oli’s signing of a BRI Framework Agreement with China identifying ten major infrastructure projects has accelerated Chinese presence and investment in roads, industrial zones, energy, and education. From Chinese language teachers in Nepali schools to cultural exchanges and student scholarships, Beijing has embedded itself deeply within Nepal’s development framework. Chinese efforts to unify Nepal’s leftist parties into a pro-Beijing bloc suggest a long game of strategic presence. India, meanwhile, remains Nepal’s largest investor, friend and most important trade partner. But China’s rise in Kathmandu is undeniable. While Nepal may stand to gain from this strategic rivalry, India should not ignore the implications. The Damak industrial park, just 100 kilometres from Siliguri corridor, highlights the geographical sensitivity of Chinese presence. Any infrastructure footprint near it should raise concerns.

Equally, China’s growing presence in Bangladesh and Myanmar is not only a worry for us, but it strengthens China’s “String of Pearls” strategy, creating a chain of influence and infrastructure from the South China Sea to the Bay of Bengal. This increases India’s geostrategic vulnerability, especially around its eastern seaboard and the Andaman Sea.

China already has massive investments in Mongla Port (Bangladesh) and strategic projects in Rakhine and Chin states (Myanmar) bringing Chinese infrastructure and potentially influence alarmingly close to Siliguri Corridor, the vital “chicken’s neck” connecting India’s northeast. This raises the risk of dual-front strategic pressure. China’s people-centric projects (e.g. hospitals, direct flights, scholarships) are winning over the Bangladeshi public. India’s reduction in visas and strained political relations post-Awami League have left a void that China is filling, undermining India’s soft power advantage. Another worry is China’s interest in Bangladesh’s Teesta River management; a transboundary water issue is again a worrisome factor.

In Myanmar, Beijing’s simultaneous support for the junta and rebel groups allows China to control key corridors (like the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor) while ensuring instability that keeps India much worried in the northeast. One needs to understand the Chinese model that promotes authoritarian resilience over democratic norms, a challenge to India’s values-driven foreign policy and its vision of a free, open Indo-Pacific. We all need to look seriously at China’s strategic embrace of Nepal, Bangladesh and Myanmar as a calibrated effort to reshape regional geopolitics. It challenges India’s primacy in its own neighbourhood and creates strategic chokepoints along India’s periphery. India must urgently recalibrate its regional strategy with greater agility, investment, and diplomacy.

Equally, India and China need to adopt a more transparent and consultative approach. Beijing must be sensitive to India’s legitimate security concerns, while India must continue building its own credible regional alternatives such as the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) without turning South Asia into a zero-sum contest. The Tibet issue also continues to strain ties. The presence of the Dalai Lama in India often irritates China, especially now that questions surrounding his succession are gaining international attention. Despite Beijing’s claims that the matter is “an internal affair,” its statements warning Indian academics and commentators should not be taken lightly.

China needs to know India does not support Tibetan separatism but offers the Tibetan spiritual leader and community respect. Both sides must manage the issue with maturity rather than remain silent over it or any third country commenting on it. The reopening of the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra, resuming of direct flights, and cultural exchanges to mark 75 years of diplomatic ties point to a broader softening and confidence building. Both governments now seem to acknowledge that the cost of hostility is high and that the dividends of cooperation are worth pursuing. Dr Jaishankar was right to state that competition must not turn into conflict. China, too, has spoken of “dragons and elephants dancing together.” These metaphors matter, but not as much as the policy behind them. Real progress will depend on action troop pullbacks, resolution of border friction points, easing trade barriers, and respecting each other’s sensitivities.

Mutual suspicion has long defined India-China relations. Two modern giants need to build a relationship defined not by rivalry but by reason. After all, in a fractured world of economic uncertainty and climate crises, a peaceful and constructive India-China relationship is not just of interest to the two countries, but also to their neighbouring countries. India needs to recalibrate its strategy. India must increase and step up its own infrastructure diplomacy in Nepal to begin with, offering alternatives that are transparent, financially viable, and culturally attuned. It should support small, quick-impact projects in border regions, as it already does. Keep them engaged with India as in the past, to consider Nepalis as more Indians than Nepalis. India still has enormous goodwill in Nepal. From open borders and educational access to religious tourism and employment, these connections must be nurtured and not taken for granted.

In parallel, India has strong reasons to be deeply concerned about China’s deepening ties with Bangladesh and Myanmar, as both developments directly impact India’s strategic depth, regional influence, and national security. It needs to recalibrate how to further strengthen the relationship in these countries, which have cultural strengths with India. We need to recapture the space left open for a third country to occupy in these neighbouring countries. India should avoid over-reliance on personalities or regimes and instead build institutional linkages across the political, cultural and economic aisle.

Surinder Singh Oberoi,

National Editor Greater Kashmir