INDIA AND AMERICA: From Embrace to Unease
For the better part of two decades, India’s foreign-policy establishment has treated the relationship with the United States as a slow-maturing but irreversible bet. From the civil nuclear deal of 2005 to defence logistics agreements, intelligence sharing, and the growing centrality of the Indo-Pacific, the basics and logic of convergence seemed irrefutable. A democracy of 1.4bn people and a superpower wary of China’s rise appeared natural partners. But recent months under Donald Trump’s leadership have cast doubt on the firmness of that growing trust and relationship. Delhi and Washington’s friendship is on the rocks.
The most visible tremor came from Washington: an order to impose a $100,000 fee on new H-1B visas that threatens not only several Indian tech firms but the aspirations of thousands of young, upcoming professionals. One analysis suggests that it accounts for 70% of these visas for India. The latest edict from Trump is not just an economic inconvenience; it is a humanitarian blow. In some cases, it has separated families and unsettled careers. NASSCOM, India’s influential tech lobby, warned of “considerable uncertainty.” The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) responded in sharp tones, calling the move “disruptive” and hinting at wider consequences.
This visa row is just one of the irritants that has come out from President Trump’s office, but New Delhi is facing a string of aggravations. The Trump administration’s decision to punish India with tariffs for buying discounted Russian oil reopened old trade wounds. American officials, including President Trump, have expressed concern over India’s deepening energy links with Moscow and Tehran that couple of months ago or with the previous governments, was no issue. Another big shock is the US concern and recent statement on Iran’s Chabahar port, a project once quietly encouraged by Washington as a counter to Pakistan’s Gwadar, now collides with shifting Gulf geopolitics. Saudi Arabia’s new military partnership with Pakistan, including security cooperation and infrastructure finance, signals that Delhi cannot count on Gulf monarchies to balance in its favour, as the majority of the Gulf countries continue to remain under US influence.
In addition to the whispers and a couple of media reports that have recently emerged about friction between the Indian embassy in Washington and an Indian think-tank, which is seen as an intervention rather than support. How true this is, but whispers continue. New Delhi has done the right thing, though late, but a forward-looking step in engaging influential lobbyists to build India’s reputation and help in easing the friction. The impression persists here that despite the good friendship of Modi and Trump that Delhi is unable to match the new government ruling in the US, where trust deficit continues. Reports also suggest that the Indian diaspora continues to remain divided rather than show strategic confidence.
A keen observer of US politics, while explaining the drift, suggests that part of it is structural and part of what Trump mentioned in his election cycle, which included protectionism, visa restrictions, and promises to “bring jobs back.” India, meanwhile, insists on strategic autonomy, not being dependent on any country, buying oil from Russia, hedging in the Gulf, and guarding its trade surplus. Neither side is willing to concede ground where it matters most to the other, despite continuing negotiations.
But the problem also lies in expectations. For years, Delhi believed that America needed to understand India’s neighbourhood countries like Pakistan, China and all other irritants like terrorism. Washington, perhaps for its part, assumed that India’s fear of Beijing would lock it ever tighter into an American embrace. It seems that both miscalculated.
The H-1B visa shows this conflict clearly. For many Americans, it has come to represent lost jobs and lower wages. For India, it is a source of pride, money, and a way to send skilled workers abroad. India may push hard to protect the programme, but the American mood is steadily moving away from welcoming more immigrants. The technology industry depends on the free movement of workers across borders. The wider economy also needs steady access to American markets, which bought more than $40 billion worth of Indian goods last year. Defence ties with the U.S. could also slow down if political trust weakens. On a more personal level, America’s universities, jobs and lifestyle have long inspired India’s middle class. If those opportunities shrink, chances of frustration growing at home can’t be ruled out.
One more takeaway is that India should not get stuck between competing powers but keep looking to increase its own path and power. The U.S. is becoming less patient about India’s close links with Russia, and even Europe is questioning India’s balancing act. At the same time, Gulf countries are moving closer to Pakistan and China. In such circumstances, India will need to rethink its foreign policy and strategy with the US. As one of the political observers said that the strategy itself needs recalibration, deserves attention. The MEA, once proud of shepherding the U.S. relationship from estrangement to entente, now faces the possibility of backsliding. Politics in no case should cloud policy.
The other factor is that India needs to revisit institutional memory. People who painstakingly built the partnership in the 2000s, like seasoned diplomats, scholars, and trade negotiators, have been more or less sidelined. It may be time to bring them back, not as partisans but as advisers. What is needed is not a flashy lobbying campaign only, but in addition, a serious, intellectual stock-taking: what does India really want from America, and what is it willing to concede? Should Delhi accept that Washington will intermittently weaponise trade and visas, and focus instead on defence and technology? Or should it double down on building domestic capacity, reducing dependence on the American market? Such a review cannot be left to officials alone. Universities, think-tanks, and industry groups must be involved, not to produce talking points, but to offer sober analysis for future research and positive results. A relationship that took 20 years of construction cannot be allowed to undo or drift.
This is not to say the India–U.S. partnership is finished. Military exercises go on, intelligence cooperation is growing, and both countries remain cautious of China. But the bond is weaker than it once was, and trust is harder to rebuild once lost. If disputes over visas and tariffs linger, and if U.S. politics harden further against India, the so-called “natural partnership” may feel less natural.
For India, the task is to stay calm but realistic. It would be a mistake to blame only Donald Trump, since any U.S. government will put American jobs and interests first. Nor can Delhi rely on slogans about “strategic autonomy” when its economy and diaspora are so closely tied to the U.S. What is needed instead is a careful review of the relationship, deciding where India can compromise, where it must stand firm, and where it should quietly balance with other partners. Two decades ago, bold thinking helped transform India–U.S. ties from mistrust to cooperation. A similar effort is now required to prevent the relationship from sliding backwards, at a time when India has a politically sensitive neighbourhood, a relationship with China, Russia and shifting Gulf politics make strong ties more important than ever. Delhi and Washington need more dialogue than distance.
Surinder Singh Oberoi,
National Editor Greater Kashmir
