Hybrid Identities

The social geographies shape human identities. Since the end of the Cold War, the world has opened to the integrated migrant networks, thereby creating asymmetrical social formations in the places where they settle down. The migration industry with structural labour has made states unable to control its borders. The migration, authorized and unauthorized, in different waves since the closing decades of the previous century has changed the sociopolitical dynamics of the nation states. The fate of the second generation understood by the concept of ‘segmental assimilation’ has lost its credence. Whether it is invited immigrants or shelter seekers; the migration more or less has generated hybrid identities in the plural societies, which are at play through political discourses shaping the process of othering, inside the nation or outside the countries.

One wonders, why all migrant workers in Kashmir and in Punjab are called Beharis, when in actuality, any sample could be heterogeneous representing different social origins from the different states of India. There could be many explanations to it. The fact is that Bihar has been the cradle of golden history of India and its prideful heritage. Just at a glance, the pan India rulers were Patna based - Ashoka, Chanderagupta Maurya, Lord Mahavir, Buddha to some extent and Guru Gobind Singh, Jai Prakash Narayan and the first president of India Dr Rajender Prasad - all luminaries were from this state, including the primer institution of the world, Nalanda University. Until 1960s, its judiciary, heath services, education and refined elite culture of Bihar were ideal types to be cherished.

What happened then? It is hard to agree to the social science justification that absence of sub nationalism and failure of regional market to compliment for sustained industrialization have lead to the collapse of social economic fabric of Bihar. Bihar Until late 1960s was a lead state of the country, ably being run by its first chief minister Sh. Krishna Sinha. It was undivided, full with minerals and human resources to hold a promise for a brighter future. The early 1970s with uneven development unfolded the semi feudal character of its society. Deliberate ruin of its social institutions through ‘Total Revolution’ changed its linear trajectory of social transformation. Whether that produced regenerative process for Indian society, might be true? But in Bihar it gave liaison to chaotic culture in the name of populism and upward mobility.

Patna became the centre of the J.P Movement of 1970s and thereafter the political de-centering of Indian state in late 1970s replaced its elite culture formation and brought out the middle caste, backward caste rise from 1974 onwards. It opened up social cleavages so abruptly, which were not allowed to be formalized by institutional framework, but permitted tacitly by state support to filch the spaces of upper castes by a popular takeover during long years of Lalu’s Raj. It was a long social disorder, perceived as resurgence of caste consciousness, which made upper castes to search for alternate places of settlement. The traditional elite caste of Bihar moved out in multitude to settle in new places for the future of their children. Banaras was the chosen choice for its educational value and cultural historicity. Huge Bihari upper caste investment in constructions, health and education appeared in Varanasi and other parts of the country, mainly in big cities. This led to flow of capital out from Bihar and displacement of qualified upper castes from Bihar to find alternate sites of settlement.

This caused underinvestment in infrastructure and collapse of education and other institutions, subsequently in their own state of Bihar. This failure of local capitalists to develop the forces of production, the strand of development got ‘entrenched’ with the state policies to allow populism to prevail over institution building. It made Bihar economically a stagnant sate and socially divided on sharp caste lines. The free corruption, criminal activities, misuse of power and emergence of middlemen mafia promoted reversal impact on employment and ecosystem of development. In subsequent years, it compelled its youth from all the rungs of the caste to search work away from the state. While migrants of good social backgrounds with the necessary social capital and education could accommodate without much rile from the native population, however, poorly educated or uneducated migrants find it difficult to generate a ‘measure of closure’ to support them. They relied more on social networking of symbolic capitalism to guide them in new places.

Punjab and Jammu Kashmir become their chosen places to search for work. Both, Punjab and Jammu Kashmir had recent histories of social turbulence, where affluence and insurgencies have generated openings from outside influences, besides enhanced state security regulations. On one hand, the youth these states, if educated wants to move out of the country, if uneducated, it is happy with its small business and farming. It has lost interest in unskilled jobs. This has created huge space unfilled for menial positions and essential requirement in labour force. Therefore, poor youth from any region of the country, who lack strong community bonds, have greater attraction to move into main cities of these states.

These states do not have communicative language a requirement, as in other southern states, the native language is a must to learn. J &K and Punjab become the heaven from migrant workers from Bengal, Bihar, Jharkhand and Madhya Pradesh. The name Bihari is given to all. It cuts across the social heterogeneity, smoothens the political optics of different political forces and it helps in running a discourse on the tradition and modernity debate. It suits to all, who hold power stakes in these two states. With gradual glide of years, their children are going to the public schools; they avail health facilities and are exposed to the counter cultural models of divergent lifestyles, cults and faiths. Their assimilation is not complete. It is hybrid in nature, producing the process of othering not only for native labour force, but also proving a camouflage entity for political agenda. There is no assurance for acculturation to the values and norms of the native society. No wonder, dropping out of school, group fights increased conflicts with parents and indulgence in drug and alcohol, joining criminal gangs are most likely challenges for intergroup accommodation and peaceful coexistence.

The trajectories followed by internal migration or external immigration more or less are trapped in the same situation. The Diaspora solidarity and new social political consciousness altercating with social origins frame the immigrant social worldview. It generates the process of ‘othering’ within the plural society. The divide is clear between native and native population.

In internal parlance you have a Bihari presumed identity for any migrant worker, similarly in Europe or North America, you have ‘Paki’ for south Asian immigrant worker, if not spoken publically, but tacitly revealed in the private places. This draws us how social constructions are perceived and framed; chaos inside your own native place can never be a substitute for sustainable pride capital in the new settlement. The social conflict riddled, when migrant can only change their identity, when their roles at their new settlements are functionally admired, and back in their native place social order is restored. Kashmir since 1990 has been treading this path for our children. If not brought reformation, Kashmir in long years ahead may undergo same social and political churning, where social origins shall remain contested for access to the resources and spaces. The re engagement with human nature debate on the elemental categories of behavior, aggression, sex, altruism and religion (Wilson, 1978) need reexamination in power discourse of language, culture and symbolic in reinforcement processes of self and the other divide. Kashmiris in future may miss the pre 1990 social formations more deeply than ever, henceforth, two decades after, when the fresh generation comes to age.

Prof Ashok Kaul, Retired Emeritus Professor of Sociology, BHU.