From drones to deterrence
When tri-services officers gathered at the Manekshaw Centre in New Delhi last week to begin training in drone warfare, cyber operations, space-based assets and supply-chain vulnerabilities, the timing was anything but accidental. Just a couple of days earlier, India’s Union Budget 2026–27 had earmarked a record ₹7.85 lakh crore for defence, perhaps it is the highest allocation in a couple of decades and one of the most important articulations of India’s strategic intent in recent years. Taken together, the two developments point to a larger shift: India is no longer merely responding to threats along its borders. It is actively re-engineering its military, industrial and doctrinal foundations to compete in a far more demanding strategic global tech-savvy environment and challenges amid the rapidly changing character of warfare.
The third edition of the Future Warfare Course, held this week in Delhi, is not just a theoretical or classroom exercise. Its focus on drones, cyber warfare, space, rare-earth supply chains, and resilient logistics reflects real lessons from recent conflicts—from Ukraine and West Asia to India’s own operational experience, including Operation Sindoor.
The presence of senior officers ranging from Majors to Major Generals, alongside representatives from start-ups, MSMEs, DPSUs and private industry, signals a shift in thinking. Future wars will not be fought by the armed forces alone. They will be shaped as much by supply chains, software, sensors, and satellite links as by boots on the ground. This fusion of operators, technologists and industry mirrors the model adopted by leading military powers. It also highlights a recognition that India’s traditional strengths, which have been manpower and experience needs to match the latest and ever-changing technological agility and jointness across services.
India’s recalibration comes against the backdrop of a tightening China–Pakistan axis. Along the Line of Actual Control, as the media has been reporting, China has invested heavily in infrastructure, surveillance, missile forces and integrated theatre commands. Pakistan, meanwhile, continues to modernise selectively with Chinese support, while retaining its reliance on asymmetric and proxy tactics. This two-front challenge demands not just numbers, but speed, intelligence dominance, and precision. Drones, networked sensors, cyber resilience, and space-based enablers are no longer force multipliers; they are prerequisites. Training officers to think, plan and fight in this environment is as important as acquiring platforms.
That is why the continuing Future Warfare Course matters. It is about preparing Indian commanders to fight smarter, faster, and more jointly, reducing the decision-action loop in crises where escalation windows are narrow and mistakes costly.
The urgency of this shift is much needed as we witness the world sliding into deeper strategic uncertainty. The war in Ukraine has shown that large, high-intensity wars are no longer a thing of the past. It has also highlighted how drones, cyber tools and industrial capacity can be as decisive as tanks and soldiers. In West Asia, the Israel–Hamas conflict carries the risk of spreading into a wider regional war, with tensions between Iran and the US continuing in the background. In the Western Hemisphere, political instability in Venezuela has again brought worries about energy security and territorial disputes. Even the Arctic, which was earlier seen mainly as a region for scientific research, is now turning into a zone of strategic competition, with growing attention on Greenland showing rising rivalry among major powers. They teach us a common reality that modern military strength depends not only on weapons, but equally on technology, supply chains, alliances, and economic strength. For India, protected by geography but still affected by global disruptions, preparing for such an uncertain and divided world is no longer a choice, it is a strategic necessity to be prepared.
Training and readiness mean little if they are not supported by enough money and latest equipment. The defence budget of ₹7.85 lakh crore, a 15% increase compared to last year, shows that the government is serious about matching its plans with funding. A key highlight is the capital spending of ₹2.19 lakh crore, of which ₹1.85 lakh crore will be used to buy new equipment and technology. This nearly 24% rise indicates a clear push for faster modernisation of the armed forces, rather than slow, step-by-step upgrades. It is definitely going to bring a major change for good.
Equally important is the decision to spend most of this money within the country. As much as 75% of the capital purchase budget, or ₹1.39 lakh crore, has been kept aside for Indian companies. This signals a strong move away from relying on imports and towards building defence capability at home. At a time when global supply chains are uncertain and trade is often influenced by politics, making more defence equipment in India is no longer just about economic growth, it is essential for national security.
Operation Sindoor and urgency
The budget also reflects the aftermath of Operation Sindoor, which exposed the need for rapid procurement, ammunition stocks, spares and platform availability. Emergency acquisitions in recent years have highlighted gaps that cannot be addressed through slow, peacetime processes and gains. The enhanced revenue allocation for operations and sustenance, over ₹1.58 lakh crore, aims to ensure readiness, maintenance and availability. In modern warfare, the ability to sustain operations often matters as much as the ability to initiate them. Defence capability, as many of the experienced experts say, should also not be dependent only on machines alone. Human intelligence, the welfare of soldiers, as well as the humanitarian sensitive touch, needs to be strengthened. Perhaps the present ministry understands it, and an increase of 45% in allocation for the Ex-Servicemen Contributory Health Scheme to ₹12,100 crore is more than a welfare measure. It reinforces morale, trust and the social contract between the state and its soldiers. Similarly, in this budget, it reflects higher pension allocations. It also said sustained investment in pay and allowances acknowledges that a professional, motivated force is central to deterrence.
In this budget, there is also an increased allocation to DRDO, over ₹29,100 crore, with a strong capital component, fits into a larger innovation ecosystem that now includes private industry, start-ups and academia. It is encouraging to know that the goal is not merely to copy existing systems, but to move ahead in key areas such as unmanned systems, AI-based decision support, electronic warfare, and space security—all of which will shape future warfare. This cycle of innovation is further strengthened through training programmes like the Future Warfare Course, where users work closely with developers. Such feedback cycles are common in advanced militaries and essential if India is to avoid building platforms that look impressive but fail in combat.
In addition to its own security and training, as future growing military might, India can also serve as a training centre for countries of the Global South. There is a strong opportunity for India to become a hub for defence training and capacity building. Many of these countries face similar problems, such as limited budgets, complex security threats, and dependence on foreign suppliers. India’s experience in indigenisation, joint operations, counter-terrorism, and high-altitude warfare, combined with structured training programmes and home-grown defence equipment, gives it a unique value proposition. As geopolitical alignments shift, defence cooperation increasingly includes training, sharing its experience and industrial partnerships. India is now better placed than ever to offer all three.
Here is a caveat. Much will depend on execution, from timely procurement reforms and strict project timelines to achieving real jointness among the three services. Institutional inertia, bureaucratic delays, and fragmented command structures, even though sometimes seen to pose serious challenges that are understood but need further muscle in implementing jointness on the ground. Yet, the direction is clear. By bringing together training, budgetary support and industrial policy, India is laying the groundwork for a military posture suited to the realities of the 21st century. It sends a clear message to adversaries that India’s deterrence is real, and to partners that India is ready to shoulder greater responsibility. At a time when the region is marked by uncertainty and growing great-power rivalry, this could be India’s strongest strategic signal yet.
Surinder Singh Oberoi,
National Editor Greater Kashmir
