FOC: Misri meeting Majid

Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister for Political Affairs Majid Takht Ravanchi visited Delhi last week to meet his Indian counterpart Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri for a process which is called Foreign Office Consultations (FOC). India holds FOCs with a fairly large number of countries. It enables the top professional diplomats of India and the other countries to discuss bilateral issues as well as the regional and the global situations. Often representatives of line ministries are involved in the FOC talks so that issues which involve them can be discussed with a view to identify areas of cooperation or to iron out differences where cooperative projects are underway.

With Iran FOCs would have, directly or indirectly, involved representatives of the Oil and Gas related ministries of both countries as well as those charged with Port Developments. The Chabahar Port is an important Indo-Iranian connectivity project going back more than two decades; both countries need to engage purposefully on it so that it achieves its full potential. However, US sanctions against Iran have retarded its growth but ways have to be found to progress it nevertheless. US sanctions have also impeded the smooth flow of India-Iran ties in the hydrocarbons sector. Now, with the Trump presidency due to come in on January 20^th more impediments in India-Iran economic and technical cooperation can be expected.

The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) statement issued on January 3 on the Misri-Ravanchi talks noted inter alia “The two sides reviewed the entire spectrum of bilateral relationship, including Chabahar Port, agricultural cooperation, trade and economic issues, as well as cultural and people-to-people ties”. While there is a history of ‘cultural’ ties between the two countries it would be truthful to acknowledge that these have diminished over time. Indeed, till the British decided in 1835 to replace Persian with English as the language of administration almost all Indians, at least, in North India, associated with governance learnt it.

In the same year the British also decided that English should be the medium of instruction in educational institutions funded by them. Hence, gradually Indians began to learn English. However, the influence of Persian continued till the early years of the 20^th century. North Indian elites who were steeped in Indo-Persianate culture considered the use of Persian as a mark of distinction. They read Persian poetry; Hafiz, Saadi and Rumi’s works were well known. This does not mean that the development of Urdu as a literary language was neglected. Now, not only in India, but in Pakistan too, Indo-Persianate culture has almost disappeared along with an interest in the Persian language. The Iranians do try through their Cultural Centres in India and Pakistan to keep an interest in Persian alive but they, doubtless, find it an uphill task.

Misri and Ravanchi would have discussed the situation in West Asia. Its impact is being felt directly by both India and Iran. However, the perceptions of the two countries on the region are different. Since the Khomeini Revolution of 1979 Iran and Israel have become implacable enemies. Iran has fully supported Hamas and Hezbollah. On its part Israel has targeted Iranian interests and is believed to be behind the assassination of Iranian scientists engaged in the country’s nuclear programme. These killings have occurred on Iranian soil. Israel’s brutal response to the Hamas attack against Israel on October 7, 2023 was criticised by Iran from the beginning while India showed sympathy for the Israeli victims. India’s relations with Israel have developed in a comprehensive manner over the past two decades.

That has not prevented India from showing increasing concern since the past six months or so for the plight of the people of Gaza. Nor has it prevented India for pressing for a two-state solution to the Israel-Palestine problem. There is an international consensus on a two-state solution. However, Iran does not accept it even though there are a few people within the country who favour a pragmatic Iranian approach towards the Israel-Palestine issue.

The Indian Foreign Ministry would have closely followed China’s forays in Iran and its intention to make vast investments, including in the Iranian hydrocarbons sector. China has also worked for Saudi Arabia and Iran to reach a modus vivendi. Diplomatic channels between the two countries have become active and a senior Saudi military delegation visited Tehran recently. It is probable that Misri would have probed Ravanchi on his assessment of Chinese activism and its intentions in West Asia.

There is the possibility of Trump adopting a more assertive policy in the region. That would include greater support for Israel and a more aggressive policy towards Iran. He has already warned Hamas in strong and typically colourful Trumpian language to release all the hostages. The region will be anxiously assessing if Trump will carry out his threats and, if so, how. It would be aware, as no doubt would both Misri and Ravanchi would be, that in first term Trump did not carry out his more dire threats. In any event both diplomats would know that with Trump as a shield Israel would be less caring about international opinion on its campaign in Gaza.

The FOCs would have discussed the situation in Afghanistan. India has gradually moved towards opening up with the Taliban. Misri met Mutaqqi, the interim Foreign Minister of Afghanistan about five days after his meeting Ravanchi. While both meetings are unconnected it is now apparent that India is willing to acknowledge and widen its engagement with the Taliban. This is a practical approach, the kind that Iran has pursued in Afghanistan.

It’s not easy to deal with Iran because it is a complex country but it is important to Indian interests. India’s engagement with it at diplomatic and political levels must meaningfully continue.