Don’t make wrong assumptions

The events in Bangladesh since the mid-July grabbed great attention from analysts and commentators in Indian media. The Indian observers seem to be overwhelmed and shocked seeing the dramatic shifts in their eastern neighbourhood. Here is a critical evaluation of the opinions that are being presented by them and the responses from the Indian state.   The Indian thought leaders from both state and non-state quarters articulate the whole event of the ‘fall of Hasina’ through four basic assumptions.

Firstly, they anticipate a strong & organized attempt of external conspiracy of the USA, Pakistan, and the Chinese elements to overthrow Hasina. This assumption fundamentally ignores the possibility of organic eruption of the public uprising in response to the despotic 15-year rule of Sheikh Hasina—which has been largely known for massive violation of human rights such as infringed freedom of expression, silencing opposition from enjoying their right to dissent, enforced disappearance and extra-judicial killings and destroying the democratic institutions by rigging elections.

No doubt, as a contemporary event, like any other event in other parts of the globe, the Bangladesh revolution has its links with some global events. For example, in 2022 onwards USA imposed sanctions on an elite security force of Bangladesh, named Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) and on one of its former heads, for being involved in enforced disappearances under the Magnitsky Act. Moreover, before the 2024 January election USA launched its customized VISA policy which categorically mentioned that persons involved in election manipulation will be denied VISA to USA.

These actions from the USA eventually had some repercussions forsome of the security forces while executing the killing orders from Hasina’s officers, which resulted in total disorder of the law enforcement agencies at the time of Hasina’s fall. Such actions from the USA can be considered as a soft gesture of support, but in no way, this can be seen as the trigger for the entire revolution. Unlike the Indian voices, people in Dhaka are looking at Washington’s reaction as just echoing the will of the people of Bangladesh.

Moreover, the actions that the Western countries have been undertaking were pre-determined, open and communicated through professional and diplomatic channels, which Indian diplomats as well as the Hasina’s officials have naively missed to follow. And now, when the masses came out in millions in the streets of Dhaka, they tend to blame the Western countries for the conspiracy.

Secondly, the Indian observers assume Jamat-e-Islami and other Islamic groups as the key agents behind the quota reform movement that was orchestrated in the universities and on the streets of Dhaka, as well as in the large cities of Bangladesh, which later turned into an anti-Hasina uprising. This overemphasising assumption on Jamat is not only misattributing the power of the new generation—but also incorrectly decoding the Gen-Z as a force.

Interestingly Sheikh Hasina had committed the same mistake by indicating the student protesters as ‘descendants of Razakars— the word meant to indicate traitors of the war of Independence 1971’— which added fuel to the fire and accelerated the agitation, as that was perceived as a massive disrespect to the young flock. And Hasina’s Indian buddies are making the same mistakes.

Notably, blaming Jamat for anything is a very common tactic used by the disciples of Hasina in Bangladesh in the last 15 years. And now people find this a ‘paranoiac’ disorder because, after the organized and state-sponsored crackdown, using both judiciary and executive, on Jamat since 2010, today’s generation has always been hearing about Jamat as an ‘invisible’ demon in Bangladesh, blamed for everything.

But at the same time, this generation has seen the ‘Chattra League and many other wings of Hasina’s Awami League doing every possible brutality and evil thing with absolute impunity. Therefore, this generation feels that anyway, Awami League is the worst possible political group that they have ever seen in life, wherein to them Jamat is merely an invisible party with a minimum support base.

Moreover, Indian analysts often decode Jamat-e-Islami as the biggest cult of anti-Indian politics, which fundamentally causes a perception that Jamat is something difficult and impossible to negotiate with. Hence the only way to combat Jamat is to engage with only anti-Jamat quarters in Bangladesh—which again leads India into the trap of keeping all eggs in one basket.

Instead of engaging with the new regime with a friendly gesture, if it signals suspicious moves to restore Awami League (AL), that will adversely affect the hope of a revived bilateral relationship with mutual respect and equity.

Thirdly, Indian observers have been assuming Sheikh Hasina and her regime with a ‘popular aura’ by its visible markers of mega infrastructural developments and heavily inflated macroeconomic data of skyrocketing growth. While they missed out on the people’s part of the story which says, Hasina’s regime was all about severely fabricated economic data forecasting (often contradicted by the WB, ADB and IFM estimations), the corruption through the mega projects and rampant inequality due to the acute level of nepotism of the people around the regime through politicization of the public service as well as the misuse of the discriminatory quota system. Due to this false decoding of Hasina’s regime,

the Indian state as well as the political commentators are stereotyping the Bangladeshi people as ungrateful to Hasina and her family. Subsequently, this false presumption leads to their future stance towards an anti-people turn—as their affection for the ousted dictator is so overwhelming that still they are obsessed with remembering their sweet past with Hasina, while the requirement of a fresh engagement with the new regime in Dhaka is much ignored.

Moreover, due to these false assumptions, the Indian observers are surprised to see the attacks on the statues of ‘Sheikh Mujib’ in Bangladesh. On the contrary, the people in Bangladesh find the installation of tall statues as a symbol of ‘autocracy’ as it attempted to establish the supremacy of Hasina’s family as the unquestionable and de-facto ruling class of the country; just because of their stance in 1971, even if they are unable to fulfil the will of the people.

Fourthly, Indian observers and most of the Indian media exaggerate the issues related to the minorities in Bangladesh. Undoubtedly this has to be accepted that post-revolution, the homes, businesses and other institutions run by the Awami-League people have come under attack as those people have accumulated wealth by supporting the Hasina’s discriminatory system. Subsequently, minority communities are also facing insecurity. And the new regime, including the communities, has honestly admitted that. However, the mindset that the Indian state as well as the civil society shows is fuelling the fire, and in most of the cases they seem to be provoking a communal angle in the happening. Truly the post-revolution violence in Bangladesh has some specific characteristics. (a), The Hasina’s tyrannical regime fired on the protesters, which killed reportedly 500 people (unconfirmed estimate mentions more than a thousand), Hindus as well. But, those deaths are being propagated as casualties of Hindus by the anti-Hasina mob. (b) All beneficiaries of Hasina’s regime including her party men, officials from police and other forces, business oligarchs and politically motivated civil administration got under the reactive response after Hasina’s sudden fall. This target had no religious angle— but the Indian media shouted saying that only Hindus were under attack, which is a distortion. (c), There is also evidence that Indian media is circulating misinformation and fake news of Hindus being attacked showing pictures of other events.

All the above assumptions of Indian minds are mainly due to their one-eyed approach of looking at Bangladesh, where they have always been subscribing to Hasina’s story, considering Bangladesh as just synonymous with Sheikh Mujib, Hasnia and their party Awami League. And they eventually considered the other entities including BNP as the elements with Pakistani inspiration.

What would be the next repercussion of these assumptions? This would fundamentally enhance the trust deficit between these two countries.

India must appraoch the new regime with open mind, as the new government in Dhaka has already made it clear to all that they will act professionally. Only a few leaders like Shashi Tharoor have made responsible comments indicating that India should give a signal that it sides with the people of Bangladesh. But New Delhi is sending wrong signals. India must sense that Hasina is accused of acute crimes against humanity during her 15-year rule.

Notably, India’s gesture towards its neighbours has some typical characteristics. Firstly, it suffers from a superiority complex due to its geography, size and relative advantage in the global area. Secondly, it tries hard to make some allies in each country and tends to aid those allies to get into power so that they are relatively in their comfort zone in securing India’s national interests. These two characteristics fundamentally limit Indian engagingement. And often when the friend collapses India gets a big shock and suddenly falls into a vacuum or diplomatic disengagement. The same happened from the West corner of Kabul to the Eastern end in Dhaka.

By: Zakaria Polash, a Bangladeshi analyst affiliated to the South Asia Foundation (SAF), completed  his master's degree in South Asia Studies from the University of Kashmir.