Demographic Data: Dynamic of Decline

This newspaper, quoting official statistics reported a sharp and steep drop in the total fertility rate (TFR) – the average number of children a woman bears in childbearing years -- in J&K (January 1st, 2025. Greater Kashmir). While the fertility rate has been on the decline for more than four decades now, the last 15 years have seen an exceptionally sharp drop. From 3.6 in 1990-91, it declined to 2.4 in 2005-06 to and 1.7 in 2015-16. Now, the latest estimates show that it stands at 1.4 in 2019-21.

This long-term decline is consistent with broader demographic trends observed in many parts nationally and globally. India’s fertility rate has seen a substantial decline, dropping from an average of 6 children per woman till 1970s to 2.7 in 2008, and further to 2.4 in 2021. Globally, the average fertility rate has halved from around 5 in the 1960s to approximately 2.4 in 2021.

In J&K, the issue is not so much about the trend, which is natural, and, in most cases, desirable reflecting improved socio-economic indicators. It is about the level of the fertility rate. At 1.4, it is not only low in absolute terms, but it is also lower than the replacement rate of 1.8. The replacement fertility rate corresponds to the average number of children per woman necessary for each generation to sustain population levels.

From this it has been hurriedly inferred, rather alarmingly, that it is a crisis and that the Kashmiri race is heading towards extinction. Social media posts added conspiracy theories to it making demographic transition to be demographic transformation.

As of 2021, over half of all countries and territories (110 out of 204) have fertility rates below the replacement level of 2.1 births per woman. In 2016, almost half of all the districts in India had below-replacement fertility levels, with only 15 per cent having fertility rates of above 3.0. This suggest that the declining as well as low fertility is neither unique nor limited to J&K.

An evidence-based analysis shows demographic transition is a predictable outcome of socio-economic progress. Many regions globally and India have experienced similar transitions. In Kerala, for instance, a fertility rate of 1.8, which is below the replacement level but has led to improvements in human development indicators.

A quick look at some of the social indicators suggest that J&K’s declining fertility rate correlates with at least some positive social indicators. J&K’s female literacy rate has increased from 55.1 per cent in 2001 to 68 per cent in 2011. Educated women often delay childbearing, have fewer children, and are more likely to use family planning methods. The crude birth rate decreased from 18.9 in 2005 to 14.9 in 2019, reflecting better healthcare services and family planning access. The infant mortality rate has also dropped from 32 in 2011 to 20 in 2021 lowering the need for larger families.

The fact that Kashmiri women marry at an average age of 26 – the highest in India, the national average being 22 years -- significantly reduces the reproductive window. Local demographers, attribute the low fertility to rapid urbanisation, unemployment and lower family incomes. There may be more to the data than improvements in social indicators. (See Postscript)

While the diagnostics reveal multiple reasons behind the decline, the prescriptive element is what should get precedence. The focus should shift toward informed dialogue and policy preparedness.

First, to be clear, a declining fertility rate does not mean short or even medium-term population reduction but slower growth. Even with a fertility rate of 1.4, J&K’s population will not shrink immediately due to population momentum. The decline will be a gradual process. The most important take away from these trends in fertility rates is the need to refocus the public policy. From a social as well as the government policy perspective, the real issue is not extinction but aging. More than the reduction of population, the challenge is of a compositional shift in the population.

For now, the current youth populations will contribute to workforce and societal growth. However, by 2030, the proportion of J&K’s elderly population is projected to rise from 8 to 12 percent. By 2035, when almost 16.5 percent of population will be above 60, it will pose a serious challenge on many fronts ranging from health care to productivity decline to fiscal crisis of the state.

Societies with low fertility rates adapt to such demographic challenges through policies promoting eldercare services, and workforce participation by older adults. With a growing proportion of elderly population, there is need to implement elder-friendly healthcare policies, creating a model for aging societies. Increased demand for geriatric care and specialized healthcare infrastructure, non-existent in Kashmir at the moment, should be planned for. States with aging populations, spend heavily on geriatric care, a scenario J&K should prepare for. The policy adaptations that have to be made is elderly-friendly healthcare systems, such long-term care state insurance schemes, or palliative care infrastructure for eldercare, focusing on community-based healthcare systems. As a society there is need to think in terms of age-friendly projects focus on creating inclusive public spaces and transportation for elderly citizens. There is also a need to develop comprehensive policies for workforce challenges be pension reforms, and skill redevelopment programs and workforce planning. These well-established models should prepare Kashmir for demographic shifts.

The narrative of extinction is alarmist and counterproductive. The fact is that a fertility rate decline is not an existential crisis but a socio-economic challenge. The focus should shift toward informed dialogue and policy preparedness. Population dynamics evolve gradually, allowing ample time for policy adjustments. Rational, data-driven approaches should ensure balanced discourse, foster a constructive conversation on J&K’s demographic future and preparedness for future demographic realities.

Postscript:

The dramatic reduction in fertility of 100 basis points over 15 years outpaces global trends, which have seen a 200-basis point drop in 60 years and a 330-basis point drop over 50 years. This can be partially attributed to the reorganisation of the state in 2019. The pre-2019 and post-2019 figures not entirely comparable.

Ladakh, being more rural and less urbanized had a higher TFR. When included in J&K’s overall data, it elevated the pre-2019 TFR. After 2019, the exclusion of Ladakh reflects only the relatively lower fertility of the districts that now form J&K resulting in the fall appearing to be steep. Hence, the data should be interpreted with caution.

Tail piece:

These fertility trends should put to rest that myth that has bedevilled Muslims in India. Among the biggest allegations made against them is having too many children because of the woman’s status as laid down by Islam and the way the institution of marriage and procreation is viewed. This even though the TFR for Muslims in 2019-21 was 2.36 compared to 1.94 among Hindus. With a Muslim majority region having the lowest fertility rate, the spurious correlation with Islam gets negated. It is low because the social indicators, especially in relation to women are better. This is the opposite of what is true among Muslims in rest of the country.

The author is Contributing Editor Greater Kashmir