Charting the new order of future wars

The Combined Commanders’ Conference (CCC) 2025, held in Kolkata between September 15th and 17th, was not an ordinary conclave of brass and bureaucrats. It took place four months after Operation Sindhoor. The gathering assumed the air of a military post-victory stocktaking session. If the operation Sindhoor was the proof of concept, the conference was about lessons learned and planning the architecture for the wars of the future.

Op Sindhoor, executed with joint precision by air, land and sea forces, offered India’s commanders something they have long sought: confirmation that integration, technological modernisation and indigenous capability-building are beginning to showcase much desired strength and results. The practical battle scenes of target destruction, as we all saw on our televisions, showcased synchronised drone strikes, space-enabled reconnaissance, cyber disruption and conventional firepower working all like an automatic machine. India has fought several winning battles in the past, like waged successful operations before from Kargil in 1999 to Balakot in 2019 but Op Sindhoor marked the most vivid demonstration yet of its ambition to fight multi-domain wars, where coordination of space, cyber and information along with hardware weapons like tanks, aircraft or warships was of much success.

The CCC has long been the apex forum for strategic dialogue between India’s top military leadership and policymakers. Yet this year’s meeting, political observers say, was of much importance as it consisted of practical available data of the used plans as well as weaponry, that will only lead to much advance improvement in future. Its theme, “Year of Reforms: Transforming for the Future”, sounded academic. But behind it lies an ambitious strategy to recast India’s war-fighting doctrine keeping in view the fast changing technology and its use.

PM Narendra Modi, in his address, pressed three watchwords: jointness, self-reliance and innovation. Defence Minister Rajnath Singh, chairing a couple of important sessions, warned that the Armed Forces must think beyond the familiar realms of tanks and fighter squadrons and prepare for “invisible wars” fought in cyberspace, in ideology, even in biology. The clear message: Op Sindhoor was not an end, but a rehearsal for a more complex future.

India’s armed forces are already among the world’s largest, with 1.4m active personnel and nearly 2.2m reservists, supported by one of the biggest paramilitary networks. They are also among the most combat-experienced, tested on the icy ridges of heights in Kargil and Ladakh, the hot deserts of Rajasthan, the dense jungles of the Northeast, and the high seas of the Indian Ocean having one of the largest coastal areas. India fields close to 4,000 tanks, over 650 combat aircraft, one of the world’s most sophisticated ballistic missile programmes, and a blue-water navy that sails from the Persian Gulf to the Malacca Strait. It has long maintained nuclear deterrence against two hostile neighbours. Even though it is less visible, more telling is its cyber command, operational since 2019,which has guided dozens of AI-driven projects into the pipeline. These range from autonomous underwater vehicles to predictive battlefield logistics.

One of the most successful demonstrations of Op Sindhoor was a demo of space-enabled warfare. Satellites provided near real-time intelligence, drones relayed live battlefield data, and precision-strike missiles were guided with pinpoint accuracy. The unveiling at the CCC of the Joint Military Space Doctrine institutionalised space as a full-fledged warfighting domain. For a country that launched its first satellite decades ago, this reflects not only technological ambition but strategic necessity.

India’s trajectory becomes clearer when measured against its neighbours. China, with a defence budget of over $225bn, nearly four times India’s, has raced ahead in hypersonic missile development, quantum communication, and naval expansion. It already commands the world’s largest navy and has integrated artificial intelligence into simulations and wargaming. Chinese strategists openly speak of “intelligentised warfare”, a doctrine where human decision-making is supplemented, and sometimes replaced, by machines that many a times may not be allowed by the laws of war. By contrast, India’s approach is more pragmatic. Its strategy is to adapt technologically, building resilience and asymmetry. The integration of AI, cyber warfare and space systems showcased in Sindhoor reflects precisely this. Rather than chasing numbers, India is betting on agility and innovation.

Pakistan, meanwhile, remains numerically inferior but continues to punch above its weight through tactical nuclear weapons, drone warfare support from Turkey and asymmetric strategies. Its armed forces have increasingly leaned on Chinese technology, from armed drones to missile systems, while relying on irregular warfare to use illegal combatants as a tool. Sindhoor’s success sent a pointed signal: India’s integrated forces are now capable of pre-emptive precision, not just defensive resilience.

No discussion of India’s military modernisation is complete without the mantra of Aatmanirbharta, or self-reliance. India has long been one of the world’s largest arms importers. Despite progress, over 35% of its defence equipment is still sourced from abroad. This dependence is a strategic vulnerability and best efforts are afoot to fill in. New defence collidors and private industry has already chipped in to cover it. The government has responded with a mix of import bans, domestic production targets and export promotion. The results are visible. India exported nearly ₹21,000 crore ($2.5bn) worth of defence equipment in 2023–24, including drones, artillery systems and BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles. The indigenous Tejas light combat aircraft is now entering squadron service. Indigenous submarines and helicopters are in advanced production. And in cyber, AI and space, where no legacy disadvantage exists, Indian start-ups and defence PSUs are innovating at pace.

The CCC devoted considerable time to these industrial issues. Delegating financial powers, cutting bureaucratic red tape, and streamlining procurement were openly debated. The challenge is formidable. India’s defence-industrial is no more totally dependent on the state-run firms, but much of the private sector has entered into it. The Op Sindhoor’s success offered an argument in favour of urgency: wars are won not only on battlefields but in factories, laboratories and satellite-control rooms.

The conference also examined the strategic neighbourhood. With instability spreading from West Asia to the South China Sea, and Russia - Ukraine war reshaping global arms markets, India cannot afford complacency. Commanders reviewed the evolving security dynamics across the Himalayas, the Indian Ocean and beyond. Rajnath Singh underlined the need for constant reassessment of the global order and its impact on India’s security environment. Attention was also paid to the welfare of personnel and veterans, including a review of the Ex-Servicemen Contributory Health Scheme. Morale, after all, is as vital as missiles. Rajnath Singh reminded commanders that resilience must extend not just to hardware but also to people, soldiers, sailors and airmen, and the families who sustain them.

The final day of the CCC highlighted the need for institutional reform. Integration across services, interoperability in multi-domain operations, and streamlined decision-making were recurring themes. The Chief of Defence Staff, General Anil Chauhan, was blunt: reforms cannot be episodic or symbolic. They must be embedded, continuous and adaptive.

He outlined a vision of the Armed Forces as laboratories of innovation, capable of absorbing advances in cyber, space, AI and biotechnology as fast as they emerge. The goal is not just to keep pace but to anticipate. In a world where adversaries exploit drones bought off-the-shelf, manipulate social media to spread disinformation, or unleash malware instead of missiles, agility matters more than size.

The CCC 2025 concluded with a sense of momentum. Op Sindhoor provided the proof. The conference provided the plan. Together, they mark a pivot in India’s military posture: from a regional force guarding borders to multi-domain power shaping events in the Indo-Pacific. Even though the challenges remain immense, the direction is unmistakable. India is moving towards becoming a technologically advanced, operationally agile and strategically confident force. For India, the post Op Sindhoor moment may prove as consequential as Pokhran in 1998. Then, it declared itself a nuclear power. Now, it signals the ambition to be a multi-domain power. The world will be watching closely, and so will its neighbours.

Surinder Singh Oberoi,

National Editor Greater Kashmir