A movement for political autonomy

The parts of the erstwhile princely state of Jammu and Kashmir which remain under the control of Pakistan are lately under the spotlight for a variety of reasons. Composing of what Islamabad calls as ‘Azad Jammu and Kashmir’(AJK) and Gilgit-Baltistan (GB), the current scenario and the nature of treatment meted to its residents’ actually fizzle Islamabad’s claims of siding and protecting Kashmiri people. The parts of Kashmir which Pakistan describes as ‘azad’ meaning free is witnessing a civil disobedience movement led by the Joint Awami Action Committee (JAAC).

In comparison to provinces of Pakistan, GB is treated ‘differently’ and a discriminatory treatment is meted out to its people. Earlier known as the Northern Areas, the ‘Karachi-Agreement’ of 1949 allowed no representation to the GB, thus bringing it under direct Pakistani rule—an authoritarian move which is criticized even today by its people.

In September 2009, Pakistan finally granted GB a participatory political system with some effective administrative powers. This appear to be modelled largely, but not totally on ‘Azad Kashmir’ political system. On August 28, 2009, “Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self-Governance Order, 2009” was introduced through which the people of GB could have their own Governor and Chief Minister with some judicial reforms in a province like status while keeping constitutional rights in oblivion. It introduced a local legislative body known as Gilgit-Baltistan Legislative Assembly (GBLA), whose 24 members are elected on the basis of adult franchise. However, the crucial areas of decision making remained with the Council headed by the Pakistan’s Prime Minister. GBLA has the legislative jurisdiction over 53 subjects. Interestingly, while the Eighteenth-Constitutional amendment of 2010 provided some leeway and autonomy to the different provinces of Pakistan, no respite of such kind was offered to the GB or its people, and have rather seen tighter control.

Not formally incorporating the territories on its side of the border, related to the Kashmir dispute, Pakistan’s ‘ambivalent’ and yet tactical position is driven by the concern that any formal incorporation of the region would imply an acceptance of the Line of Control (LoC) and a renunciation of Pakistan’s claims over Indian Kashmir. Hence, the rationale of keeping the status of GB ambiguous is to create the perception of its importance in case plebiscite is held on the political future of Jammu and Kashmir.

Multifaceted protests have also erupted in GB which Islamabad has meticulously carved into a geopolitical zone intended to serve its strategic interests especially with regard to China’s ambitious China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Envisaging a network of road and railways, the CPEC project passes through the disputed territory of GB.

In GB, a major hydro power project of Diamer-Bhasa dam is being built jointly by the Chinese Power firm and Pakistan Army’s commercial wing. In GB, protestors have long been demanding subsidies on wheat which remains staple food of the region. The policy of wheat supply to GB on subsidised rates dates back to 1970s and this was necessitated due to exorbitant prices of wheat flour in the areas.

The civil society organisations of GB have been demanding availability of wheat as per old requirements of 20,000 bags annually, and that too at affordable prices. Inspite of the fact that GB is endowed with natural resources which are exploited by the Pakistani government; it has not taken care of the food crisis there. Besides raising the issue of wheat, the civil society organisations are demanding the rights and ownership of all resources available in the region and especially are claiming full royalty over land and water resources including the Diamer-Bhasa dam.

For the part of Kashmir which Pakistan refers as “azad” meaning free, a civil disobedience movement has been underway there from more than six months. People are protesting against the inflated electricity bills and wheat prices. There are reports that a sizeable percentage of the ‘AJK’ population haven’t paid their electricity bills since the beginning of this protest movement. According to estimates, AJK nearly contributes 3400MW of electricity to Pakistan. For the power production of one unit, it costs 2 rupees.

Despite providing huge amount of electricity to Pakistan’s power grid, AJK residents are not offered any concession and instead are asked to pay tariffs as per the National Electric Power Regulatory Authority’s (NEPRA) formula. As a result of this, residents of the AJK are being charged with an electricity rate of over 30 rupees per unit, and also have to encounter hours of load shedding. Consequently, in a set of demands put forth by the JAAC includes minimum charges of electricity per unit that too in accordance to its production cost.

Islamabad Electric and Supply Corporation (IESCO) took the matter to the country’s Supreme Court where it argued that extra charges had to be inflicted as the electricity has to be exported from Pakistan to AJK, escaping the fact that essentially the electricity gets produced in AJK only. Furthermore for strengthening its claims, IESCO cited how India was also applying similar charges to the residents of Kashmir on its side.

Considering the sensitivity of the issue, Supreme Court refrained itself from making any judgement and rather directed the IESCO to take up the matter with the federal government. Consequently, several rounds of negotiations between Muzaffarabad and Islamabad, as well as between the JAAC and the AJK government have failed to reach a common consensus. While Islamabad so far has not yielded in to the demands of the region, however it surely has strengthened the ongoing movement and its resolve for seeking more political autonomy and control over regions natural resources.

By Mohammed Usman Bhatti and Muneeb Yousuf

Mohammed Usman Bhatti and Muneeb Yousuf are researchers at MP-IDSA New Delhi.