A campus divided by design
The UGC Equity Regulations 2026 present the Supreme Court of India with a constitutional test it cannot afford to evade. At issue is not whether discrimination exists in higher education it does, and it must be addressed decisively but whether the state is permitted to combat discrimination by abandoning equality before law, procedural fairness, and institutional neutrality. These regulations, as notified, create a system of asymmetric legal protection that conflicts with Article 14, dilutes natural justice, and risks converting grievance redressal into an instrument of selective power. In doing so, they cross a constitutional line.
The origins of the regulations lie in genuine grievance. The deaths of Rohith Vemula and Payal Tadvi raised disturbing questions about caste prejudice, institutional apathy, and the failure of existing safeguards. Their families approached the Supreme Court not seeking a new legal regime, but demanding enforcement of an old one: the UGC’s Promotion of Equity Regulations, 2012. Those rules already required Equal Opportunity Cells and grievance mechanisms for SC and ST students. The constitutional failure was not legislative absence, but executive non-implementation.
This distinction matters. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that where enforcement fails, the remedy lies in compliance and oversight, not in rewriting law in a manner that disturbs constitutional balance. The UGC itself appeared to understand this when it issued a draft in February 2025. That draft strengthened equity mechanisms while preserving due process. Complaints were to be investigated, evidence heard, and decisions reasoned. Crucially, it included a deterrent against demonstrably false or malicious complaints, recognising that institutional justice systems without abuse safeguards inevitably collapse under mistrust.
The final 2026 regulations represent a decisive departure from that approach. The most constitutionally problematic feature is the definition of “caste-based discrimination” as conduct exclusively against SC, ST, and OBC individuals. This design choice is not symbolic, it has legal consequence. It means only members of certain categories can invoke the regulatory machinery of discrimination. Others, regardless of facts, intent, or harm, are excluded from equivalent protection. The Supreme Court has consistently held that classification must satisfy intelligible differentia and rational nexus. In quasi-judicial grievance frameworks, identity-based access to justice fails both tests.
Affirmative action is constitutionally permissible when it seeks to remedy historical disadvantage in access to education, employment, or representation. But grievance redressal systems are not welfare schemes, they are adjudicatory mechanisms. When the state creates bodies empowered to investigate, censure, and penalise, it must apply uniform procedural safeguards. Article 14 does not permit a system where one citizen may complain and another may not, solely by virtue of social classification. Such asymmetry converts protection into privilege.
Equally troubling is the removal of safeguards against false complaints. Natural justice is not only about protecting complainants, it is about protecting the integrity of process. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasised that fairness requires balancing competing rights. By deleting deterrents against bad-faith complaints, the regulations abandon that balance. They create a presumption that identity substitutes for credibility, an assumption alien to constitutional adjudication.
The composition of Equity Committees raises further concerns. Mandatory representational quotas based on caste, category, disability, and gender may be appropriate in deliberative or advisory bodies, but adjudicatory committees demand neutrality, expertise, and confidentiality. Universities are not legislatures , they are institutions of learning. Committees designed as identity aggregates risk transforming grievance redressal into factional negotiation rather than impartial inquiry. The Supreme Court has cautioned against structures that compromise institutional independence under the guise of inclusion.
The likely chilling effect on academic decision making cannot be dismissed as speculative. Faculty evaluations, grading decisions, disciplinary action, and supervision inherently involve judgment. When every adverse academic outcome carries the risk of being retrospectively framed as discriminatory, without reciprocal safeguards, the rational response is avoidance. The Constitution does not require the creation of environments governed by fear rather than fairness.
Proponents argue that ministerial assurances will prevent misuse. Constitutional courts cannot rely on assurances when statutory text is unambiguous. The Supreme Court has consistently held that law must be judged as written, not as defended in affidavits or press conferences. The regulations, on their face, establish unequal access to grievance mechanisms and weaken procedural protections. That is the legal reality the Court must confront.
The February 2025 draft demonstrates that less intrusive, constitutionally compliant alternatives were available. The executive’s choice to abandon them under pressure does not bind the judiciary. On the contrary, it heightens the Court’s responsibility. Judicial review exists precisely to correct executive excess when policy, however well-intentioned, undermines constitutional structure.
This case is not about denying historical injustice or minimising discrimination. It is about ensuring that remedies do not generate new forms of injustice. The Constitution does not permit trade-offs between equity and equality , it demands their reconciliation. The Supreme Court’s task is not to choose sides in a social debate, but to uphold symmetry, proportionality, and due process.
If allowed to stand, the UGC Equity Regulations 2026 will normalise selective justice in institutional governance. They will establish the precedent that grievance rights may be distributed by identity rather than citizenship. That precedent extends far beyond campuses. The Court must therefore subject these regulations to strict scrutiny, test them against Article 14 and principles of natural justice, and insist on procedural universality.
A campus divided by design is not an accident of policy, it is a constitutional failure. Restoring fairness now lies not with assurances or amendments, but with judicial correction. The Supreme Court must intervene not to weaken protections against discrimination, but to ensure that the fight against discrimination remains faithful to the Constitution itself.
The Writer is a social activist and columnist working at the grassroots level to bridge public concern with policy action.
