31 Maoists, 2 security force personel killed in gunbattle in Chhattisgarh's Bijapur
New Delhi, Feb 9: In a major blow to Naxal insurgency, security forces have killed 31 Naxalites in an operation in Indravati National Park, Bijapur, Chhattisgarh. Union Home Minister Amit Shah lauded the action as a major step toward making India Naxal-free and confirmed the recovery of a large cache of weapons and explosives.
In a post on X (formerly Twitter), Shah described the operation as a landmark success in the government's ongoing crackdown on Left-Wing Extremism. However, he also acknowledged the sacrifice of two security personnel, stating that the nation remains indebted to these Bravehearts.
“The country has taken another step in eliminating anti-human Naxalism. We have lost two of our brave soldiers in this mission, and I extend my heartfelt condolences to their families,” Shah said.
Reaffirming the government's commitment, he reiterated that Naxalism will be completely eradicated by March 31, 2026, ensuring that no citizen will lose their life to insurgent violence.
According to reports, this marks the second encounter in this national park this year. The park borders the Abujhmad forests, a well-known stronghold for Maoist insurgents.
The central government, under the instruction of Home Minister Amit Shah, has vowed to end Naxalism by 2026. Earlier, Amit Shah said on January 6, when eight security force personnel were killed in an IED blast in Bijapur, Chhattisgarh.
The encounter comes a week after eight more Maoists were killed in an earlier gunbattle with the security forces in Bijapur district on January 31.
Around 62 Naxalites were killed in the last couple of months. It is an indication of a trend that has been unfolding.
According to reports, this is the second encounter that has taken place this year in this national park. This national park is adjacent to Abujhmad forests, a usual safe hideout for the Maoists.
For decades, Maoist insurgency, often called the Naxalite movement and officially called Left-Wing Extremism (LWE), was one of the country’s most difficult internal security threats. However, recent developments suggest that the rebellion is now in its sunset phase.
Several factors, including government counterinsurgency measures, the erosion of ideological fervour, and the movement’s increasing disconnection from tribal communities, have played a major role in the slow decline of left-wing extremism in India.
Over the past few years, security forces have conducted multiple successful operations, dealing heavy blows to Maoist leadership and surely but slowly taking control of difficult terrain in Bastar, Chattisgarh area, where Maoists once controlled the area as well as the tribals living in the jungles.
One of the incidents in 2021 was a trigger to counter the Maoist insurgency when 22 security force personnel were killed in an ambush in Chhattisgarh. Since then, relentless operations have steadily weakened the insurgents, with major encounters taking place in Sukma, Bijapur, and Narayanpur districts.
Home Ministry data reveals a stark decline in Maoist-related violence. The number of insurgency-related deaths has fallen from nearly 1,000 per year in the early 2010s to fewer than 100 in 2024. Moreover, Maoist presence has shrunk dramatically, with only a handful of districts, mostly in Chhattisgarh, Odisha, and Jharkhand, still witnessing rebel activity.
The success of the counter-Maoist strategy can largely be attributed to a combination of security crackdowns, security provided to the locals living in the area and, above all, simultaneous developmental outreach. The government’s National Policy and Action Plan to Combat Left-Wing Extremism launched a decade ago, has been particularly effective. This policy rests on three pillars:
Security Operations: The deployment of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), commando units like the CoBRA (Commando Battalion for Resolute Action), and state police forces has significantly improved ground intelligence and operational efficiency. Modernized weapons and technology, drone surveillance, and better coordination between central and state agencies have further crippled Maoist activities.
Development Initiatives: The government has aggressively pursued infrastructure development in Maoist-affected regions, including roads, bridges, and electricity. Programs like the Aspirational Districts Programme and Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana have sought to integrate remote tribal areas into the mainstream economy, reducing local support for Maoists. The introduction of new schools and health programmes has further helped the authorities to build trust with the tribals.
Surrender and Rehabilitation: The central and state governments have offered attractive surrender policies, leading to the defection of hundreds of Maoist cadres. Many ex-Maoists have reintegrated into society, further weakening the insurgency’s manpower.
Union Home Minister Amit Shah has repeatedly asserted that the Maoist insurgency is in its final stages. Shah reiterated the government’s commitment to eliminating left-wing extremism completely. Shah, time and again in his public lectures, has said that the backbone of Naxalism is broken and in the last phase and will be soon rooted out completely in the coming couple of years.
Home Minister Shah credited the success to Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s dual strategy of security enforcement and development. He also emphasized that the reduction of Maoist-affected districts from 96 in 2010 to just 24 in 2024 proves that India is close to eradicating the movement.
While government efforts have played a crucial role in weakening the insurgency, the movement itself has been unravelling due to internal challenges:
The Maoists have suffered severe losses among their senior ranks. The death of key leaders like Muppala Lakshman Rao (Ganapathy) and the ageing of others like Nambala Keshava Rao (Basavaraj) have left the organization without a clear direction.
Once Maoist ideology, rooted in Marxist-Leninist-Maoist principles, the movement has increasingly struggled to stay ideologically relevant in modern India with new cadres who only believe in military strength, unlike their earlier leaders who were educated and believed in other methods of influence. Many former sympathizers have distanced themselves from what they see as a movement more focused on extortion and violence than genuine revolution.
The Maoists traditionally drew strength from tribal communities, but their forced recruitments, kidnappings, and violent crackdowns on suspected informers have eroded local support.
The massive use of technology has further supported surveillance. Security forces now use drones, satellite surveillance, and electronic intelligence. It helps troops to identify the Maoists hideouts in their traditional forest strongholds.
Despite these setbacks, the insurgency has not been completely wiped out. Maoist factions still retain influence in pockets of Chhattisgarh, Odisha, Maharashtra, and Jharkhand.
Intermittent Moaidt attacks, ambushes, and more use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) blasts continue to pose threats to security personnel and civilians. However, the scale and frequency of Maoist violence have definitely diminished.
The government is now focusing on ensuring that areas once under Maoist control do not slip back into violence. Expanding road networks and mobile telephone towers, improving governance, and offering livelihood opportunities to local communities remains critical to achieving a long-term solution.
The decline of the Maoist insurgency, as one of the political observers said, can serve as a compelling case study of how a balanced strategy combining military pressure, strategic patience, and socioeconomic development can effectively neutralise an armed rebellion.
Maoist movements, for decades, have thrived by exploiting grievances related to land rights, tribal displacement, and economic inequality.
However, a sustained counterinsurgency campaign, combined with improved intelligence, specialised anti-Maoist forces, and strategic operations, gradually weakened their military capability. At the same time, the government adopted a long-term approach, recognising that a purely militaristic solution would be insufficient.
The government's initiative of investment in infrastructure, education, and livelihood programs in Maoist-affected regions helped address the root causes of insurgency that helped in eroding local support for the Maoists.
As one of the observers said, patience and long-term strategy were key to the solution. Socio-economic initiatives took time to yield results but combined with relentless security operations, they ultimately led to friendly and positive results and helped in the decline in Maoist influence.
This multidimensional approach highlights the importance of integrating force with reform, demonstrating that insurgencies are best countered not just with guns but with governance.
At present, occasional incidents of violence may occur however, the Maoist movement—which once posed a significant threat has largely diminished in strength and influence. It has now been reduced to a mere shadow of its former self, struggling to maintain relevance in a changing political and security landscape.